Implicative algebras: a new foundation for realizability and forcing by Miquel, Alexandre
Under consideration for publication in Math. Struct. in Comp. Science
Implicative algebras: a new foundation for
realizability and forcing
A l e x a n d r e M I Q U E L1
1 Instituto de Matema´tica y Estad´ıstica Prof. Ing. Rafael Laguardia
Facultad de Ingenier´ıa – Universidad de la Repu´blica
Julio Herrera y Reissig 565 – Montevideo C.P. 11300 – URUGUAY
Received 16 July 2019
We introduce the notion of implicative algebra, a simple algebraic structure intended to
factorize the model-theoretic constructions underlying forcing and realizability (both in
intuitionistic and classical logic). The salient feature of this structure is that its elements
can be seen both as truth values and as (generalized) realizers, thus blurring the frontier
between proofs and types. We show that each implicative algebra induces a (Set-based)
tripos, using a construction that is reminiscent from the construction of a realizability
tripos from a partial combinatory algebra. Relating this construction with the
corresponding constructions in forcing and realizability, we conclude that the class of
implicative triposes encompass all forcing triposes (both intuitionistic and classical), all
classical realizability triposes (in the sense of Krivine) and all intuitionistic realizability
triposes built from partial combinatory algebras.
1. Introduction
In this paper, we introduce the notion of implicative algebra, a simple algebraic structure
that is intended to factorize the model-theoretic constructions underlying forcing and
realizability, both in intuitionistic and classical logic.
Historically, the method of forcing was introduced by Cohen (Cohen, 1963; Cohen,
1964) to prove the relative consistency of the negation of the continuum hypothesis
w.r.t. the axioms of set theory. Since then, forcing has been widely investigated—both
from a proof-theoretic point of view and from a model-theoretic point of view—, and
it now constitutes a standard item in the toolbox of set theorists (Jech, 2002). From a
model-theoretic point of view, the method of forcing can be understood as a particular
way to construct Boolean-valued models of the considered theory (typically: set theory
or higher-order arithmetic), in which each formula φ is interpreted as an element
JφK ∈ B
of a given complete Boolean algebra B. If one is only interested in interpreting intuition-
istic theories, one can replace complete Boolean algebras by complete Heyting algebras,
in which case similar construction methods give us Heyting-valued models, that are es-
sentially equivalent to Kripke (i.e. intuitionistic) forcing or Beth forcing.
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As observed by Scott (van Oosten, 2002), there is a strong similarity between (intu-
itionistic or classical) forcing and the method of realizability, that was introduced by
Kleene (Kleene, 1945) to give a constructive semantics to Heyting (i.e. intuitionistic)
arithmetic. From a model-theoretic point of view, the method of realizability consists to
interpret each closed formula φ as a set of realizers
JφK ∈ P(P )
where P is a suitable algebra of “programs” (typically: a partial combinatory algebra),
following the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics for intuitionistic logic. Although
the method of realizability was initially introduced for intuitionistic first-order arith-
metic, it easily extends to intuitionistic higher-order arithmetic and even to intuitionistic
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (Myhill, 1973; Friedman, 1973; McCarty, 1984).
For a long time, the method of realizability was limited to intuitionistic logic. However,
from the mid-90’s, Krivine reformulated (Krivine, 2009) the principles of realizability to
make them compatible with classical logic, using the correspondence between classical
reasoning and control operators discovered by Griffin (Griffin, 1990). Technically, classical
realizability departs from intuitionistic realizability by interpreting each formula φ not
as a set of realizers, but as a set of counter-realizers (a.k.a. a falsity value)
JφK ∈ P(Π)
where Π is the set of stacks associated to an algebra of classical programs Λ (Krivine,
2011; Streicher, 2013). The corresponding set of realizers (or truth value) is then de-
fined indirectly, as the orthogonal JφK‚ ⊆ Λ of the falsity value JφK ⊆ Π with respect
to a particular set of processes ‚ ⊆ Λ × Π —the pole of the model— that parame-
terizes the construction. As for intuitionistic realizability, classical realizability extends
to higher-order arithmetic and even to (classical) Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (Krivine,
2001; Krivine, 2012), possibly enriched with some weak forms of the axiom of choice.
In spite of their similarity, there is a fundamental difference between forcing and real-
izability, regarding the treatment of connectives and quantifiers. In forcing, conjunction
and disjunction are interpreted as binary meets and joins
Jφ ∧ ψK = JφKuprise JψK and Jφ ∨ ψK = JφKg JψK
(respectively writing b uprise c and b g c the meet and the join of two elements b, c ∈ B),
whereas universal and existential quantifications are interpreted by
J∀xφ(x)K = k
v∈M
Jφ(v)K and J∃xφ(x)K = j
v∈M
Jφ(v)K .
So that from the point of view of (intuitionistic or classical) forcing, conjunction and
disjunction are just finite forms of universal and existential quantifications. This is defi-
nitely not the case in intuitionistic realizability, where conjunctions and disjunctions are
interpreted as Cartesian products and direct sums
Jφ ∧ ψK = JφK× JψK and Jφ ∨ ψK = JφK+ JψK
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whereas universal and existential quantifications are still interpreted uniformly†:
J∀xφ(x)K = ⋂
v∈M
Jφ(v)K and J∃xφ(x)K = ⋃
v∈M
Jφ(v)K .
(The situation is slightly more complex in classical realizability, in which existential
quantification and disjunction have to be interpreted negatively. But the above picture
still holds for conjunctions and universal quantifications.) In some sense, realizability is
more faithful to proof-theory, in which proving a universal quantification
` φ(x)
` ∀xφ(x)
(that is: providing a generic proof that holds of all instances of the variable x) is much
stronger than proving a (finitary or infinitary) conjunction:
` φ(t0) ` φ(t1) ` φ(t2) · · · ` φ(tn) · · ·
` φ(t0) ∧ φ(t1) ∧ φ(t2) ∧ · · · ∧ φ(tn) ∧ · · ·
(that is: providing a distinct proof for each instance of the variable x)‡
But what do have in common an element of a complete Heyting (or Boolean) algebra,
a set of realizers (taken in a combinatory algebra P ) or a set of counter-realizers (taken
in a set of stacks Π)? The aim of this paper is to show that all these notions of ‘truth
value’ pertain to implicative algebras, a surprisingly simple algebraic structure whose
most remarkable feature is to use the same set to represent truth values and realizers,
thus blurring the frontier between proofs and types. As a matter of fact (Section 2.3),
implicative algebras offer a fresh semantic reading of typing and definitional ordering in
terms of subtyping, that is now the primitive notion.
However, implicative algebras do not only encompass the various notions of ‘truth
value’ underlying forcing and realizability, but they also allow us to factorize the cor-
responding model-theoretic constructions. For that, we shall place ourselves in the cat-
egorical framework of triposes (Hyland et al., 1980), that was introduced precisely to
compare forcing and realizability in the perspective of constructing categorical models
of higher-order logic. Intuitively, a tripos is a Set-indexed Heyting algebra of ‘predi-
cates’ P : Setop → HA (see Def. 4.7 p. 39) that constitutes a (categorical) model of
higher-order logic. Triposes can be built from a variety of algebraic structures, such as
complete Heyting (or Boolean) algebras, Partial Combinatory Algebras, Ordered Com-
binatory Algebras (van Oosten, 2008) and even Abstract Krivine Structures (Streicher,
2013). And each tripos can be turned into a topos (i.e. a ‘Set-like category’) via the
standard tripos-to-topos construction (Hyland et al., 1980).
† Here, we put aside the case of numeric (or arithmetic) quantifications, that can always be decomposed
as a uniform quantification followed by a relativization: (∀x∈N)φ(x) ≡ ∀x (x ∈ N ⇒ φ(x)) and
(∃x∈N)φ(x) ≡ ∃x (x ∈ N ∧ φ(x)).
‡ The distinction between uniform constructions (e.g. intersection and union types) and non-uniform
constructions (Cartesian product and direct sum) has always been overlooked in model theory, al-
though it is at the core of the phenomenon of incompleteness in logic. Indeed, Go¨del’s undecidable
sentence is a Π01-formula G ≡ ∀xφ(x) that is built from a particular ∆00-predicate φ(x) that has no
generic proof, although each closed instance φ(n) (n ∈ N) has.
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As we shall see in Section 4, all the above tripos constructions (as well as the corre-
sponding topos constructions) can be factored through a unique construction, namely:
the construction of an implicative tripos from a given implicative algebra. Thanks to this
factorization, we will be able to characterize forcing in terms of non-determinism (from
the point of view of generalized realizers), and we shall prove that classical implicative
triposes are equivalent to Krivine’s classical realizability triposes.
Sources of inspiration & related works
The notion of implicative algebra emerged from so many sources of inspirations that it is
almost impossible to list them all here. Basically, implicative algebras were designed from
a close analysis of the algebraic structure underlying falsity values in Krivine realizabil-
ity (Krivine, 2009), noticing that this structure is very similar to the one of reducibility
candidates (Tait, 1967; Girard et al., 1989; Werner, 1994; Parigot, 1997). Other sources
of inspiration are the notion of semantic type in coherence spaces (Miquel, 2000) as well
as the notion of fact (or behavior) in phase semantics (Girard, 1987).
The idea of reconstructing λ-terms from implication and infinitary meets came from
filter models (Barendregt et al., 1983), that are strongly related to implicative algebras
from a technical point of view, although they are not implicative algebras. The same idea
appeared implicitly in Streicher’s reconstruction of Krivine’s tripos (Streicher, 2013) and
more explicitly in (Ferrer Santos et al., 2017), that introduced many of the ideas that are
presented here, but in a slightly different framework, closer to Streicher’s. Similar ideas
were developed independently by Ruyer, whose applicative lattices (Ruyer, 2006, p. 29)
are equivalent to a particular case of implicative structures, namely: to the implicative
structures that are compatible with joins (Section 3.8).
Outline of the paper
In Section 2, we introduce the notion of implicative structure (as a natural generalization
of the notion of complete Heyting algebra), and show how the elements of such a struc-
ture can be used to represent both truth values (or types) and realizers. In Section 3, we
introduce the fundamental notion of separator (that generalizes the usual notion of filter)
as well as the accompanying notion of implicative algebra. We show how each separator
induces a particular Heyting algebra (intuitively: the corresponding algebra of proposi-
tions), and give a first account on the relationship between forcing and non-determinism
(Prop. 3.30 p. 33). Section 4 is devoted to the construction of the implicative tripos in-
duced by a particular implicative algebra. We show that implicative triposes encompass
many well-known triposes, namely: (intuitionistic and classical) forcing triposes, clas-
sical realizability triposes (Streicher, 2013), intuitionistic realizability triposes induced
by (total) combinatory algebras, and even intuitionistic realizability triposes induced
by partial combinatory algebras (Section 4.7). We also characterize forcing triposes as
the non-deterministic implicative triposes (Theorem 4.13 p. 45), and show that classical
implicative triposes are equivalent to classical realizability triposes (Theorem 4.19 p. 48).
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2. Implicative structures
2.1. Definition
Definition 2.1 (Implicative structure). An implicative structure is a complete meet-
semilattice (A ,4) equipped with a binary operation (a, b) 7→ (a → b), called the impli-
cation of A , that fulfills the following two axioms:
(1) Implication is anti-monotonic w.r.t. its first operand and monotonic w.r.t. its second
operand:
if a′ 4 a and b 4 b′, then (a→ b) 4 (a′ → b′) (a, a′, b, b′ ∈ A )
(2) Implication commutes with arbitrary meets on its second operand:
a→
k
b∈B
b =
k
b∈B
(a→ b) (a ∈ A , B ⊆ A )
Remarks 2.2. (1) By saying that (A ,4) is a complete meet-semilattice, we mean that
every subset of A has a greatest lower bound (i.e. a meet). Such a poset has always a
smallest element ⊥ = cA and a largest element > = c∅. More generally, every subset
of A has also a least upper bound (i.e. a join), so that a complete meet-semilattice
is actually the same as a complete lattice. However, in what follows, we shall mainly
be interested in the meet-semilattice structure of implicative structures, so that it is
convenient to think that implicative structures are (complete) lattices only by accident.
(2) In the particular case where B = ∅, axiom (2) states that (a → >) = > for all
a ∈ A . (Recall that> = c∅.) In some circumstances, it is desirable to relax this equality,
by requiring that axiom (2) hold only for the nonempty subsets B of A . Formally, we call
a quasi-implicative structure any complete meet-semilattice A equipped with a binary
operation (a, b) 7→ (a → b) that fulfills both axioms (1) and (2) of Def. 2.1, the latter
being restricted to the case where B 6= ∅. From this definition, we easily check that a
quasi-implicative structure is an implicative structure if and only if (> → >) = >.
2.2. Examples of implicative and quasi-implicative structures
2.2.1. Complete Heyting algebras The most obvious examples of implicative structures
are given by complete Heyting algebras. Recall that a Heyting algebra is a bounded
lattice (H,4) equipped with a binary operation (a, b) 7→ (a→ b) (Heyting’s implication)
characterized by the adjunction
(cuprise a) 4 b iff c 4 (a→ b) (a, b, c ∈ H)
Historically, Heyting algebras have been introduced as the intuitionistic counterpart of
Boolean algebras, and they can be used to interpret intuitionistic provability the same
way as Boolean algebras can be used to interpret classical provability. In this frame-
work, conjunction and disjunction are interpreted by binary meets and joins, whereas
implication is interpreted by the operation a → b. This interpretation validates all rea-
soning principles of intuitionistic propositional logic, in the sense that every propositional
formula that is intuitionistically valid is denoted by the truth value >.
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Boolean algebras are the Heyting algebras (H,4) in which negation is involutive, that
is: ¬¬a = a for all a ∈ H, where negation is defined by ¬a := (a→ ⊥). Boolean algebras
more generally validate all classical reasoning principles, such as the law of excluded
middle (ag ¬a = >) or Peirce’s law ((((a→ b)→ a)→ a) = >).
A Heyting (or Boolean) algebra is complete when the underlying lattice is complete.
In a complete Heyting algebra, the interpretation depicted above naturally extends to
all formulas of predicate logic, by interpreting universal and existential quantifications
as meets and joins of families of truth values indexed over a fixed nonempty set. Again,
this (extended) interpretation validates all reasoning principles of intuitionistic predicate
logic. It is easy to check that in a complete Heyting algebra, Heyting’s implication fulfills
both axioms (1) and (2) of Def. 2.1, so that:
Fact 2.3. Every complete Heyting algebra is an implicative structure.
In what follows, we shall say that an implicative structure (A ,4,→) is a complete
Heyting algebra when the underlying lattice (A ,4) is a (complete) Heyting algebra, and
when the accompanying implication (a, b) 7→ (a→ b) is Heyting’s implication.
2.2.2. Dummy implicative structures Unlike Heyting’s implication, the implication of an
implicative structure A is in general not determined by the ordering of A , and several
implicative structures can be defined upon the very same complete lattice structure:
Example 2.4 (Dummy implicative structures). Let (L,4) be a complete lattice.
There are at least two distinct ways to define a dummy implication a → b on L that
fulfills the axioms (1) and (2) of Def. 2.1:
(1) Put (a→ b) := b for all a, b ∈ L.
(2) Put (a→ b) := > for all a, b ∈ L.
Each of these two definitions induces an implicative structure on the top of the com-
plete lattice (L,4). From the point of view of logic, these two examples are definitely
meaningless, but they will be useful as a source of counter-examples.
2.2.3. Quasi-implicative structures induced by partial applicative structures Another im-
portant source of examples is given by the structures underlying intuitionistic realizabil-
ity (van Oosten, 2008). Recall that a partial applicative structure (PAS) is a nonempty
set P equipped with a partial binary operation (·) : P ×P ⇀ P , called application. Such
an operation naturally induces a (total) binary operation (a, b) 7→ (a→ b) on the subsets
of P , called Kleene’s implication, that is defined for all a, b ⊆ P by:
a→ b := {z ∈ P : ∀x∈ a, z · x ↓∈ b}
(where z · x ↓∈ b means that z · x is defined and belongs to b). We easily check that:
Fact 2.5. Given a partial applicative structure (P, · ):
(1) The complete lattice (P(P ),⊆) equipped with Kleene’s implication a→ b is a quasi-
implicative structure (in the sense of Remark 2.2 (2)).
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(2) The quasi-implicative structure (P(P ),⊆,→) is an implicative structure if and only
if the underlying operation of application (x, y) 7→ x · y is total.
We shall come back to this example in Section 2.7.1.
A variant of the above construction consists to replace the subsets of P by the partial
equivalence relations (PER) over P , that is, by the binary relations on P that are both
symmetric and transitive—but not reflexive in general. The set of partial equivalence
relations over P , written PER(P ), is clearly closed under arbitrary intersection (in the
sense of relations), so that the poset (PER(P ),⊆) is a complete meet-semilattice. Kleene’s
implication naturally extends to partial equivalence relations, by associating to all a, b ∈
PER(P ) the relation (a→2 b) ∈ PER(P ) defined by:
a→2 b := {(z1, z2) ∈ P 2 : ∀(x1, x2)∈ a, (z1 · x1, z2 · x2) ↓∈ b} .
Again:
Fact 2.6. Given a partial applicative structure (P, · ):
(1) The complete lattice (PER(P ),⊆) equipped with Kleene’s implication a →2 b is a
quasi-implicative structure (in the sense of Remark 2.2 (2)).
(2) The quasi-implicative structure (PER(P ),⊆,→2) is an implicative structure if and
only if the underlying operation of application (x, y) 7→ x · y is total.
Remark 2.7. The reader is invited to check that the last two examples of (quasi-)
implicative structures fulfill the following additional axiom(j
a∈A
a
)
→ b =
k
a∈A
(a→ b) (for all A ⊆ A and b ∈ A )
In what follows, we shall see that this axiom—that already holds in complete Heyting
algebras—is characteristic from the implicative structures coming from intuitionistic re-
alizability or from (intuitionistic or classical) forcing. (On the other hand, this axiom
does not hold in the implicative structures coming from classical realizability, except in
the degenerate case of forcing.) We shall come back to this point in Section 3.8.
2.2.4. Quasi-implicative structures of reducibility candidates Other examples of quasi-
implicative structures are given by the various notions of reducibility candidates (Tait,
1967; Girard et al., 1989; Werner, 1994; Parigot, 1997) that are used to prove strong
normalization. Let us consider for instance the case of Tait’s saturated sets (Tait, 1967).
Recall that a set S of (possibly open) λ-terms is saturated (in the sense of Tait) when
it fulfills the following three criteria:
(i) S ⊆ SN, where SN is the set of all strongly normalizing terms.
(ii) If x is a variable and if u1, . . . , un ∈ SN, then xu1 · · ·un ∈ S.
(iii) If t{x := u0}u1 · · ·un ∈ S and u0 ∈ SN, then (λx . t)u0u1 · · ·un ∈ S.
The set of all saturated sets, written SAT, is closed under Kleene’s implication, in the
sense that for all S, T ∈ SAT one has S → T = {t : ∀u∈S, tu ∈ T} ∈ SAT. Again:
Fact 2.8. The triple (SAT,⊆,→) is a quasi-implicative structure.
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The reader is invited to check that the same holds if we replace Tait’s saturated sets by
other notions of reducibility candidates, such as Girard’s reducibility candidates (Girard
et al., 1989) or Parigot’s reducibility candidates (Parigot, 1997). Let us mention that in
each case, we only get a quasi-implicative structure, in which we have (> → >) 6= >. The
reason is that full implicative structures (which come with the equation (> → >) = >)
are actually expressive enough to interpret the full λ-calculus (see Section 2.4), so that
they are incompatible with the notion of (weak or strong) normalization.
2.2.5. Implicative structures of classical realizability The final example—which is the
main motivation of this work—is given by classical realizability, such as introduced by
Krivine (Krivine, 2001; Krivine, 2003; Krivine, 2009; Krivine, 2011; Krivine, 2012). Ba-
sically, classical realizability takes place in a structure of the form (Λ,Π, · ,‚) where:
• Λ is a set whose elements are called terms, or realizers;
• Π is a set whose elements are called stacks, or counter-realizers;
• ( · ) : Λ×Π→ Π is a binary operation for pushing a term onto a stack;
• ‚ ⊆ Λ×Π is a binary relation between Λ×Π, called the pole.
(Krivine’s classical realizability structures actually contain many other ingredients—cf
Section 2.7.2—that we do not need for now.) From such a quadruple (Λ,Π, · ,‚), we let:
• A := P(Π);
• a 4 b :⇔ a ⊇ b (for all a, b ∈ A )
• a→ b := a‚ · b = {t · pi : t ∈ a‚, pi ∈ b} (for all a, b ∈ A )
writing a‚ := {t ∈ Λ : ∀pi ∈ a, (t, pi) ∈ ‚} ∈ P(Λ) the orthogonal of the set a ∈ P(Π)
w.r.t. the pole ‚ ⊆ Λ×Π. Again, it is easy to check that:
Fact 2.9. The triple (A ,4,→) is an implicative structure.
Remark 2.10. The reader is invited to check that Krivine’s implication a→ b = a‚ · b
fulfills the two additional axioms(k
a∈A
a
)
→ b =
j
a∈A
(a→ b) and a→
(j
b∈B
b
)
=
j
b∈B
(a→ b)
for all a, b ∈ A , A,B ⊆ A , A,B 6= ∅. It is worth to notice that these extra properties
are almost never used in classical realizability, thus confirming that only the properties
of meets really matter in such a structure.
We shall come back to this example in Section 2.7.2.
2.3. Viewing truth values as generalized realizers: a manifesto
Intuitively, an implicative structure (A ,4,→) represents a semantic type system in
which the ordering a 4 b expresses the relation of subtyping, whereas the operation
a → b represents the arrow type construction. From the point of view of logic, it is
convenient to think of the elements of A as truth values according to some notion of
realizability, that is: as sets of realizers enjoying particular closure properties.
Following this intuition, we can always view an actual realizer t as a truth value,
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namely: as the smallest truth value that contains t. This truth value, written [t] and
called the principal type of the realizer t, is naturally defined as the meet of all truth
value containing t as an element. Through the correspondence t 7→ [t]§, the membership
relation t ∈ a rephrases in term of subtyping as [t] 4 a, so that we can actually manipulate
realizers as if they were truth values.
But the distinctive feature of implicative structures is that they allow us to proceed
the other way around. That is: to manipulate all truth values as if they were realizers.
Technically, this is due to the fact that the two fundamental operations of the λ-calculus—
application and λ-abstraction—can be lifted to the level of truth values (Section 2.4).
Of course, such a possibility definitely blurs the distinction between the particular truth
values that represent actual realizers (the principal types) and the other ones. So that
the framework of implicative structures actually leads us to perform a surprising identifi-
cation, between the notion of truth value and the notion of realizer, now using the latter
notion in a generalized sense.
Conceptually, this identification relies on the idea that every element a ∈ A may also
be viewed as a generalized realizer, namely: as the realizer whose principal type is a itself
(by convention). In this way, the element a, when viewed as a generalized realizer, is not
only a realizer of a, but it is more generally a realizer of any truth value b such that
a 4 b. Of course, there is something puzzling in the idea that truth values are their own
(generalized) realizers, since this implies that any truth value is realized, at least by itself.
In particular, the bottom truth value ⊥ ∈ A , when viewed as a generalized realizer, is so
strong that it actually realizes any truth value. But this paradox only illustrates another
aspect of implicative structures, which is that they do not come with an absolute criterion
of consistency. To introduce such a ‘criterion of consistency’, we shall need to introduce
the notion of separator (Section 3), which plays the very same role as the notion of filter
in Heyting (or Boolean) algebras.
Due to the identification between truth values and (generalized) realizers, the partial
ordering a 4 b can be given different meanings depending on whether we consider the
elements a and b as truth values or as generalized realizers. For instance, if we think of a
and b both as truth values, then the ordering a 4 b is simply the relation of subtyping.
And if we think of a as a generalized realizer and of b as a truth value, then the relation
a 4 b is nothing but the realizability relation (‘a realizes b’). But if we now think of
both elements a and b as generalized realizers, then the relation a 4 b means that the
(generalized) realizer a is at least as powerful as b, in the sense that a realizes any truth
value c that is realized by b. In forcing, we would express it by saying that a is a stronger
condition than b. And in domain theory, we would naturally say that a is more defined
than b, which we would write a w b.
The latter example is important, since it shows that when thinking of the elements
of A as generalized realizers rather than as truth values, then the reverse ordering a < b
is conceptually similar to the definitional ordering in the sense of Scott. Note that this
point of view is consistent with the fact that the theory of implicative structures (see
§ Note that this correspondence automatically identifies realizers that have the same principal type.
But since such realizers are clearly interchangeable in the ‘logic’ of A , this identification is harmless.
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Def. 2.1 and Remark 2.2 (1)) is built around meets, that precisely correspond to joins
from the point of view of definitional (i.e. Scott) ordering. In what follows, we shall refer
to the relation a 4 b as the logical ordering, whereas the symmetric relation b < a (which
we shall sometimes write b v a) will be called the definitional ordering.
Using these intuitions as guidelines, it is now easy to lift all the constructions of the
λ-calculus to the level of truth values in an arbitrary implicative structure.
2.4. Interpreting λ-terms
From now on, A = (A ,4,→) denotes an arbitrary implicative structure.
Definition 2.11 (Application). Given two points a, b ∈ A , we call the application
of a to b and write ab the element of A that is defined by
ab :=
k{
c ∈ A : a 4 (b→ c)} .
As usual, we write ab1b2 · · · bn := ((ab1)b2) · · · bn for all a, b1, b2, . . . , bn ∈ A .
Thinking in terms of definitional ordering rather than in terms of logical ordering, this
definition expresses that ab is the join of all c ∈ A such that the implication b → c
(which is analogous to a step function) is a lower approximation of a:
ab :=
⊔{
c ∈ A : (b→ c) v a} .
Proposition 2.12 (Properties of application). For all a, a′, b, b′ ∈ A :
(1) If a 4 a′ and b 4 b′, then ab 4 a′b′ (Monotonicity)
(2) (a→ b)a 4 b (β-reduction)
(3) a 4 (b→ ab) (η-expansion)
(4) ab = min
{
c ∈ A : a 4 (b→ c)} (Minimum)
(5) ab 4 c iff a 4 (b→ c) (Adjunction)
Proof. For all a, b ∈ A , we write Ua,b = {c ∈ A : a 4 (b → c)}, so that ab :=
c
Ua,b.
(The set Ua,b is upwards closed, from the variance of implication.)
(1) If a 4 a′ and b 4 b′, then Ua′,b′ ⊆ Ua,b (from the variance of implication), hence we
get ab =
c
Ua,b 4
c
Ua′,b′ = a
′b′.
(2) It is clear that b ∈ Ua→b,a, hence (a→ b)a =
c
Ua→b,a 4 b.
(3) We have (b→ ab) = (b→ cUa,b) = cc∈Ua,b(b→ c) < a, from the def. of Ua,b.
(4) From (3), it is clear that ab ∈ Ua,b, hence ab = min(Ua,b).
(5) Assuming that ab 4 c, we get a 4 (b→ ab) 4 (b→ c) from (3). Conversely, assuming
that a 4 (b→ c), we have c ∈ Ua,b and thus ab =
c
Ua,b 4 c.
Corollary 2.13 (Application in a complete Heyting algebra). In a complete Heyt-
ing algebra (H,4,→), application is characterized by ab = auprise b for all a, b ∈ H.
Proof. For all c ∈ A , we have ab 4 c iff a 4 (b → c) by Prop. 2.12 (5). But from
Heyting’s adjunction, we also have a 4 (b → c) iff a uprise b 4 c. Hence ab 4 c iff a uprise b 4 c
for all c ∈ A , and thus ab = auprise b.
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Corollary 2.14 (Application in a total applicative structure). In the implicative
structure (P(P ),⊆,→) induced by a total applicative structure (P, · ) (cf Fact 2.5 p. 6),
application is characterized by ab = {x · y : x ∈ a, y ∈ b} for all a, b ∈ P(P ).
Proof. Let a · b = {x · y : x ∈ a, y ∈ b}. It is clear that for all c ∈ P(P ), we have
a · b ⊆ c iff a ⊆ (b→ c). Therefore: a · b = ab, by adjunction.
Definition 2.15 (Abstraction). Given an arbitrary function f : A → A , we write λf
the element of A defined by:
λf :=
k
a∈A
(a→ f(a)) .
(Note that we do not assume that the function f is monotonic.)
Again, if we think in terms of definitional ordering rather than in terms of logical
ordering, then it is clear that this definition expresses that λf is the join of all the step
functions of the form a→ f(a), where a ∈ A :
λf :=
⊔
a∈A
(a→ f(a)) .
Proposition 2.16 (Properties of abstraction). For all f, g : A → A and a ∈ A :
(1) If f(a) 4 g(a) for all a ∈ A , then λf 4 λg (Monotonicity)
(2) (λf)a 4 f(a) (β-reduction)
(3) a 4 λ(b 7→ ab) (η-expansion)
Proof. (1) Obvious from the variance of implication.
(2) From the definition of λf , we have λf 4 (a → f(a)). Applying Prop. 2.12 (1)
and (2), we get (λf)a 4 (a→ f(a))a 4 f(a).
(3) Follows from Prop. 2.12 (3), taking the meet for all b ∈ A .
We call a λ-term with parameters in A any λ-term (possibly) enriched with constants
taken in the set A—the ‘parameters’. Such enriched λ-terms are equipped with the usual
notions of β- and η-reduction, considering parameters as inert constants.
To every closed λ-term t with parameters in A , we associate an element of A , written
tA and defined by induction on the size of t by:
aA := a
(tu)A := tA uA
(λx . t)A := λ(a 7→ (t{x := a})A )
(if a ∈ A )
(application in A )
(abstraction in A )
Proposition 2.17 (Monotonicity of substitution). For each λ-term t with free vari-
ables x1, . . . , xk and for all parameters a1 4 a′1, . . . , ak 4 a′k, we have:
(t{x1 := a1, . . . , xk := ak})A 4 (t{x1 := a′1, . . . , xk := a′k})A .
Proof. By induction on t, using Prop. 2.12 (1) and Prop. 2.16 (1).
Proposition 2.18 (β and η). For all closed λ-terms t and u with parameters in A :
(1) If tβ u, then tA 4 uA
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(2) If tη u, then tA < uA
Proof. Obvious from Prop. 2.16 (2), (3) and Prop. 2.17.
Remark 2.19. It is important to observe that an implicative structure is in general not
a denotational model of the λ-calculus, since the inequalities of Prop. 2.18 are in general
not equalities, as shown in Example 2.20 below. Let us recall that in a denotational
model D of the λ-calculus (where t =βη u implies t
D = uD), the interpretation function
t 7→ tD is either trivial, either injective on βη-normal forms. This is no more the case in
implicative structures, where some βη-normal terms may collapse, while others do not.
We shall come back to this problem in Section 2.7.
Example 2.20 (Dummy implicative structure). Let us consider the dummy im-
plicative structure (cf Example 2.4 (2)) constructed on the top of a complete lattice
(L,4) by putting a→ b := > for all a, b ∈ A . In this structure, we observe that:
• ab = c{c ∈ A : a 4 (b→ c)} = cA = ⊥ for all a, b ∈ A ;
• λf = ca∈A (a→ f(a)) = > for all functions f : A → A .
So that for any closed λ-term t, we immediately get:
tA =
{
> if t is an abstraction
⊥ if t is an application
(The reader is invited to check that the above characterization is consistent with the
inequalities of Prop. 2.18.) In particular, letting I := λx . x, we observe that:
• I I→β I, but (I I)A (=⊥) 6= IA (=>);
• λx . I Ix→η I I, but (λx . I Ix)A (=>) 6= (I I)A (=⊥).
Proposition 2.21 (λ-terms in a complete Heyting algebra). If (A ,4,→) is a
complete Heyting algebra, then for all (pure) λ-terms with free variables x1, . . . , xk and
for all parameters a1, . . . , ak ∈ A , we have:
(t{x1 := a1, . . . , xk := ak})A < a1 uprise · · ·uprise ak .
In particular, for all closed λ-terms t, we have: tA = >.
Proof. Let us write ~x = x1, . . . , xk and ~a = a1, . . . , ak. We reason by induction on t,
distinguishing the following cases:
• t = x (variable). This case is obvious.
• t = t1t2 (application). In this case, we have:
(t{~x := ~a})A = (t1{~x := ~a})A (t2{~x := ~a})A
= (t1{~x := ~a})A uprise (t2{~x := ~a})A
< a1 uprise · · ·uprise ak
(by Coro. 2.13)
(by IH)
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• t = λx0 . t0 (abstraction). In this case, we have:
(t{~x := ~a})A =
k
a0∈A
(
a0 → (t0{x0 := a0, ~x := ~a})A
)
<
k
a0∈A
(
a0 → a0 uprise a1 uprise · · ·uprise ak
)
< a1 uprise · · ·uprise ak
(by IH)
using the relation b 4 (a→ auprise b) (for all a, b ∈ A ) in the last inequality.
Remark 2.22. The above result is reminiscent from the fact that in forcing (in the sense
of Kripke or Cohen), all (intuitionistic or classical) tautologies are interpreted by the top
element (i.e. the weakest condition). This is clearly no more the case in (intuitionistic or
classical) realizability, as well as in implicative structures more generally.
2.5. Semantic typing
Any implicative structure A = (A ,4,→) naturally induces a semantic type system
whose types are the elements of A .
In this framework, a typing context is a finite list Γ = x1 : a1, . . . , xn : an, where
x1, . . . , xn are pairwise distinct λ-variables and where a1, . . . , an ∈ A . Thinking of the
elements of A as realizers rather than as types, we may also view every typing context
Γ = x1 : a1, . . . , xn : an as the substitution Γ = x1 := a1, . . . , xn := an.
Given a typing context Γ = x1 : a1, . . . , xn : an, we write dom(Γ) = {x1, . . . , xn}
its domain, and the concatenation Γ,Γ′ of two typing contexts Γ and Γ′ is defined as
expected, provided dom(Γ)∩dom(Γ′) = ∅. Given two typing contexts Γ and Γ′, we write
Γ′ 4 Γ when for every declaration (x : a) ∈ Γ, there is a type b 4 a such that (x : b) ∈ Γ′.
(Note that the relation Γ′ 4 Γ implies that dom(Γ′) ⊇ dom(Γ).)
Given a typing context Γ, a λ-term t with parameters in A and an element a ∈ A ,
we define the (semantic) typing judgment Γ ` t : a as the following shorthand:
Γ ` t : a :⇔ FV (t) ⊆ dom(Γ) and (t[Γ])A 4 a
(using Γ as a substitution in the right-hand side inequality). From this semantic definition
of typing, we easily deduce that:
Proposition 2.23 (Semantic typing rules). For all typing contexts Γ, Γ′, for all λ-
terms t, u with parameters in A and for all a, a′, b ∈ A , the following ‘semantic typing
rules’ are valid:
— If (x : a) ∈ Γ, then Γ ` x : a (Axiom)
— Γ ` a : a (Parameter)
— If Γ ` t : a and a 4 a′, then Γ ` t : a′ (Subsumption)
— If Γ′ 4 Γ and Γ ` t : a, then Γ′ ` t : a (Context subsumption)
— If FV (t) ⊆ dom(Γ), then Γ ` t : > (>-intro)
— If Γ, x : a ` t : b, then Γ ` λx . t : a→ b (→-intro)
— If Γ ` t : a→ b and Γ ` u : a, then Γ ` tu : b (→-elim)
Moreover, for every family (ai)i∈I of elements of A indexed by a set (or a class) I:
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— If Γ ` t : ai (for all i ∈ I), then Γ ` t :
k
i∈I
ai (Generalization)
Proof. Axiom, Parameter, Subsumption, >-intro: Obvious.
Context subsumption: Follows from Prop. 2.17 (monotonicity of substitution).
→-intro: Let us assume that FV (t) ⊆ dom(Γ, x := a) and (t[Γ, x := a])A 4 b. It is clear
that FV (λx . t) ⊆ dom(Γ) and x /∈ dom(Γ), so that:(
(λx . t)[Γ]
)A
=
(
λx . t[Γ]
)A
=
k
a0∈A
(
a0 →
(
t[Γ, x := a0]
)A )
4 a→ (t[Γ, x := a])A 4 a→ b .
→-elim: Let us assume that FV (t),FV (u) ⊆ dom(Γ), (t[Γ])A 4 a→ b and (u[Γ])A 4 a.
It is clear that FV (tu) ⊆ dom(Γ), and from Prop. 2.12 (2) we get:(
(tu)[Γ]
)A
=
(
t[Γ]
)A (
u[Γ]
)A 4 (a→ b)a 4 b .
Generalization: Obvious, by taking the meet.
2.6. Some combinators
Let us now consider the following combinators (using Curry’s notations):
I = λx . x K = λxy . x
B = λxyz . x(yz) W = λxy . xyy
C = λxyz . xzy S = λxyz . xz(yz)
It is well-known that in any polymorphic type assignment system, the above λ-terms can
be given the following (principal) types:
I : ∀α (α→ α)
B : ∀α ∀β ∀γ ((α→ β)→ (γ → α)→ γ → β)
K : ∀α ∀β (α→ β → α)
C : ∀α ∀β ∀γ ((α→ β → γ)→ β → α→ γ)
W : ∀α ∀β ((α→ α→ β)→ α→ β)
S : ∀α ∀β ∀γ ((α→ β → γ)→ (α→ β)→ α→ γ)
Turning the above syntactic type judgments into semantic type judgments (Section 2.5)
using the typing rules of Prop. 2.23, it is clear that in any implicative structure A =
(A ,4,→), we have the following inequalities:
IA 4
k
a∈A
(a→ a), KA 4
k
a,b∈A
(a→ b→ a),
SA 4
k
a,b,c∈A
((a→ b→ c)→ (a→ b)→ a→ c), etc.
A remarkable property of implicative structures is that the above inequalities are actually
equalities, for each one of the six combinators I, B, K, C, W and S:
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Proposition 2.24. In any implicative structure (A ,4,→), we have:
IA =
k
a∈A
(a→ a) BA =
k
a,b,c∈A
((a→ b)→ (c→ a)→ c→ b)
KA =
k
a,b∈A
(a→ b→ a) CA =
k
a,b,c∈A
((a→ b→ c)→ b→ a→ c)
WA =
k
a,b∈A
((a→ a→ b)→ a→ b) SA =
k
a,b,c∈A
((a→ b→ c)→ b→ a→ c)
Proof. Indeed, we have:
• IA = (λx . x)A =
k
a∈A
(a→ a) (by definition)
• KA = (λxy . x)A =
k
a∈A
(
a→
k
b∈A
(b→ a)
)
=
k
a,b∈A
(a→ b→ a) (by axiom (2))
• By semantic typing, it is clear that:
SA =
(
λxyz . xz(yz)
)A 4 k
a,b,c∈A
((a→ b→ c)→ (a→ b)→ a→ c).
Conversely, we have:k
a,b,c∈A
((a→ b→ c)→ (a→ b)→ a→ c)
4
k
a,d,e∈A
(
(a→ ea→ da(ea))→ (a→ ea)→ a→ da(ea))
4
k
a,d,e∈A
(
(a→ da)→ e→ a→ da(ea))
4
k
a,d,e∈A
(d→ e→ a→ da(ea))
=
k
d∈A
(
d→
k
e∈A
(
e→
k
a∈A
(
a→ da(ea)))) = (λxyz . xz(yz))A = SA
(using Prop. 2.12 (3) twice)
(using Prop. 2.12 (3) again)
• The proofs for B, W and C proceed similarly.
Remark 2.25. The above property does not generalize to typable terms that are not in
β-normal form. For instance, the term II = (λx . x)(λx . x) has the principal polymorphic
type ∀α (α→ α), but in the dummy implicative structure used in Example 2.20 (where
a→ b = > for all a, b ∈ A ), we have seen that
II (=⊥) 6=
k
a∈A
(a→ a) (= I = >) .
However, we conjecture that in any implicative structure (A ,4,→), the interpretation
of each closed λ-term in β-normal form is equal to the interpretation of its principal type
in a polymorphic type system with binary intersections (Coppo et al., 1980; Ronchi della
Rocca and Venneri, 1984).
2.6.1. Interpreting call/cc Since Griffin’s seminal work (Griffin, 1990), it is well-known
that the control operator cc (‘call/cc’, for: call with current continuation) can be given
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the type ((α → β) → α) → α that corresponds to Peirce’s law. In classical realizabil-
ity (Krivine, 2009), the control operator cc (that naturally realizes Peirce’s law) is the key
ingredient to bring the full expressiveness of classical logic into the realm of realizability.
By analogy with Prop. 2.24, it is possible to interpret the control operator cc in any
implicative structure A = (A ,4,→) by identifying it with Peirce’s law, thus letting
ccA :=
k
a,b∈A
(((a→ b)→ a)→ a)
=
k
a∈A
((¬a→ a)→ a)
(Peirce’s law)
where negation is defined by ¬a := (a → ⊥) for all a ∈ A . (The second equality easily
follows from the properties of meets and from the variance of implication.)
Of course, the fact that it is possible to interpret the control operator cc in any im-
plicative structure does not mean that any implicative structure is suited for classical
logic, since it may be the case that ccA = ⊥, as shown in the following example:
Example 2.26 (Dummy implicative structure). Let us consider the dummy im-
plicative structure (cf Example 2.4 (1)) constructed on the top of a complete lattice
(L,4) by putting a→ b := a for all a, b ∈ L. In this structure, we have:
ccA =
k
a,b∈L
(((a→ b)→ a)→ a) =
k
a∈L
a = ⊥ .
The interpretation t 7→ tA of pure λ-terms naturally extends to all λ-terms containing
the constant cc, by interpreting the latter by ccA .
Proposition 2.27 (cc in a complete Heyting algebra). Let (A ,4,→) be a complete
Heyting algebra. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) (A ,4,→) is a (complete) Boolean algebra;
(2) ccA = >;
(3) tA = > for all closed λ-terms with cc.
Proof. Let us assume that (A ,4,→) is a complete Heyting algebra.
(1)⇒ (2). In the case where (A ,4,→) is a Boolean algebra, Peirce’s law is valid in A ,
so that ((¬a→ a)→ a) = > for all a ∈ A . Hence ccA = >, taking the meet.
(1) ⇒ (3). Let us assume that ccA = >. Given a closed λ-term t with cc, we have
t = t0{x := cc} for some pure λ-term t0 such that FV (t0) ⊆ {x}. From Prop. 2.21, we
thus get tA = (t0{x := ccA })A < ccA = >, hence tA = >.
(3)⇒ (1). From (3) it is clear that ccA = >, hence ((¬a→ a)→ a) = > for all a ∈ A .
Therefore (¬¬a→ a) = ((¬a→ ⊥)→ a) < ((¬a→ a)→ a) = >, hence (¬¬a→ a) = >
for all a ∈ A , which means that (A ,4,→) is a Boolean algebra.
2.7. The problem of consistency
Although it is possible to interpret all closed λ-terms (and even the control operator cc)
in any implicative structure (A ,4,→), the counter-examples given in Examples 2.20
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and 2.26 should make clear to the reader that not all implicative structures are suited to
interpret intuitionistic or classical logic. In what follows, we shall say that:
Definition 2.28 (Consistency). An implicative structure (A ,4,→) is:
— intuitionistically consistent when tA 6= ⊥ for all closed λ-terms;
— classically consistent when tA 6= ⊥ for all closed λ-terms with cc.
We have seen that complete Heyting/Boolean algebras are particular cases of implica-
tive structures. From Prop. 2.21 and 2.27, it is clear that:
Proposition 2.29 (Consistency of complete Heyting/Boolean algebras). All
non-degenerated complete Heyting (resp. Boolean) algebras are intuitionistically (resp.
classically) consistent, as implicative structures.
2.7.1. The case of intuitionistic realizability Let us recall (van Oosten, 2008) that:
Definition 2.30 (Partial combinatory algebra). A partial combinatory algebra (or
PCA, for short) is a partial applicative structure (P, · ) (Section 2.2.3) with two elements
k, s ∈ P satisfying the following properties for all x, y, z ∈ P :
(1) (k · x)↓, (s · x)↓ and ((s · x) · y)↓;
(2) (k · x) · y ' x;
(3) ((s · x) · y) · z ' (x · z) · (y · z).
(As usual, the symbol ' indicates that either both sides of the equation are undefined,
or that they are both defined and equal.)
Let (P, · , k, s) be a PCA. In Section 2.2.3, we have seen (Fact 2.5) that the underlying
partial applicative structure (P, · ) induces a quasi-implicative structure (P(P ),⊆,→)
based on Kleene’s implication. Since we are only interested here in full implicative struc-
tures (in which (> → >) = >), we shall now assume that the operation of application
(·) : P 2 → P is total, so that the above axioms on k, s ∈ P simplify to:
(k · x) · y = x and ((s · x) · y) · z = (x · z) · (y · z) (for all x, y, z ∈ P )
The quadruple (P, · , k, s) is then called a (total) combinatory algebra (CA).
We want to show that the implicative structure A = (P(P ),⊆,→) induced by any
(total) combinatory algebra (P, · , k, s) is intuitionistically consistent, thanks to the pres-
ence of the combinators k and s. For that, we call a closed combinatory term any closed
λ-term that is either K (= λxy . x), either S (= λxyz . xz(yz)), or the application t1t2
of two closed combinatory terms t1 and t2. Each closed combinatory term t is naturally
interpreted in the set P by an element tP ∈ P that is recursively defined by:
KP := k, SP := s and (t1t2)
P := tP1 · tP2 .
We then easily check that:
Lemma 2.31. For each closed combinatory term t, we have: tP ∈ tA .
Proof. By induction on t, distinguishing the following cases:
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• t = K. In this case, we have:
KP = k ∈
⋂
a,b∈P(P )
(a→ b→ a) = KA (by Prop. 2.24)
• t = S. In this case, we have:
SP = s ∈
⋂
a,b,c∈P(P )
((a→ b→ c)→ (a→ b)→ a→ c) = SA (by Prop. 2.24)
• t = t1t2, where t1, t2 are closed combinatory terms. By IH, we have tP1 ∈ tA1 and
tP2 ∈ tA2 , hence tP = tP1 · tP2 ∈ tA1 tA2 = tA , by Coro. 2.14.
From the above observation, we immediately get that:
Proposition 2.32 (Consistency). The implicative structure (P(P ),⊆,→) induced by
any (total) combinatory algebra (P, · , k, s) is intuitionistically consistent.
Proof. Let t be a closed λ-term. From the theory of λ-calculus, there is a closed com-
binatory term t0 such that t0 β t. We have tP0 ∈ tA0 (by Lemma 2.31) and tA0 ⊆ tA
(by Prop. 2.18), hence tA 6= ∅ (= ⊥).
(The implicative structure (P(P ),⊆,→) is not classically consistent, in general.)
2.7.2. The case of classical realizability
Definition 2.33 (Abstract Krivine Structure). An abstract Krivine structure (or
AKS ) is any structure of the form K = (Λ,Π,@, · , k , K, S, cc,PL,‚), where:
— Λ and Π are nonempty sets, whose elements are respectively called the K-terms and
the K-stacks of the AKS K;
— @ : Λ×Λ→ Λ (‘application’) is an operation that associates to each pair of K-terms
t, u ∈ Λ a K-term @(t, u) ∈ Λ, usually written tu (by juxtaposition);
— ( · ) : Λ×Π→ Π (‘push’) is an operation that associates to each K-term t ∈ Λ and to
each K-stack pi ∈ Π a K-stack t · pi ∈ Π;
— k : Π→ Λ is a function that turns each K-stack pi ∈ Π into a K-term kpi ∈ Π, called
the continuation associated to pi;
— K, S, cc ∈ Λ are three distinguished K-terms;
— PL ⊆ Λ is a set of K-terms, called the set of proof-like K-terms, that contains the
three K-terms K, S and cc, and that is closed under application;
— ‚ ⊆ Λ×Π is a binary relation between K-terms and K-stacks, called the pole of the
AKS K, that fulfills the following axioms
t ‚ u · pi implies tu ‚ pi
t ‚ pi implies K ‚ t · u · pi
t ‚ v · uv · pi implies S ‚ t · u · v · pi
t ‚ kpi · pi implies cc ‚ t · pi
t ‚ pi implies kpi ‚ t · pi′
for all t, u, v ∈ Λ and pi, pi′ ∈ Π.
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Remarks 2.34. (1) The above closure conditions on the pole ‚ ⊆ Λ × Π actually
express that it is closed by anti-evaluation, in the sense of the evaluation rules
tu ? pi  t ? u · pi
K ? t · u · pi  t ? pi
S ? t · u · v · pi  t ? v · uv · pi
cc ? t · pi  t ? kpi · pi
kpi ? t · pi′  t ? pi
(writing t ? pi = (t, pi) the process formed by a K-term t and a K-stack pi).
(2) The notion of AKS—that was introduced by Streicher (Streicher, 2013)—is very
close to the notion of realizability structure such as introduced by Krivine (Krivine, 2011),
the main difference being that the latter notion introduces more primitive combinators,
essentially to mimic the evaluation strategy of the λc-calculus (Krivine, 2009). However,
in what follows, we shall not need such a level of granularity, so that we shall stick to
Streicher’s definition.
In Section 2.2.5, we have seen (Fact 2.9) that the quadruple (Λ,Π, · ,‚) underlying any
abstract Krivine structure K = (Λ,Π,@, · , k , K, S, cc,PL,‚) induces an implicative
structure A = (A ,4,→) that is defined by:
• A := P(Π);
• a 4 b :⇔ a ⊇ b (for all a, b ∈ A )
• a→ b := a‚ · b = {t · pi : t ∈ a‚, pi ∈ b} (for all a, b ∈ A )
where a‚ := {t ∈ Λ : ∀pi ∈ a, (t, pi) ∈ ‚} ∈ P(Λ) is the orthogonal of the set a ∈ P(Π)
w.r.t. the pole ‚ ⊆ Λ×Π.
Note that since the ordering of subtyping a 4 b is defined here as the relation of inverse
inclusion a ⊇ b (between two sets of stacks a, b ∈ P(Π)), the smallest element of the
induced implicative structure A = (A ,4,→) is given by ⊥ = Π.
Remark 2.35. In (Streicher, 2013), Streicher only considers sets of stacks a ∈ P(Π)
such that a‚‚ = a, thus working with a smaller set of ‘truth values’ A ′ given by:
A ′ := P‚(Π) = {a ∈ P(Π) : a‚‚ = a} .
Technically, such a restriction requires to alter the interpretation of implication, by adding
another step of bi-orthogonal closure:
a→′ b := (a‚ · b)‚‚ (for all a, b ∈ A ′)
However, the resulting triple (A ′,4,→′) is in general not an implicative structure, since
it does not fulfill axiom (2) of Def. 2.1¶. For this reason, we shall follow Krivine by
considering all sets of stacks as truth values in what follows.
¶ As a consequence, the constructions presented in (Streicher, 2013; Ferrer Santos et al., 2017) only
fulfill half of the adjunction of Prop. 2.12 (5), the missing implication being recovered only up to
a step of η-expansion, by inserting the combinator E = λxy . xy appropriately (see (Streicher, 2013;
Ferrer Santos et al., 2017) for the details).
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The basic intuition underlying Krivine’s realizability is that each set of K-stacks a ∈
P(Π) represents the set of counter-realizers (or attackers) of a particular formula, whereas
its orthogonal a‚ ∈ P(Λ) represents the set of realizers (or defenders) of the same
formula‖. In this setting, the realizability relation is naturally defined by
t  a :⇔ t ∈ a‚ (for all t ∈ Λ, a ∈ A )
However, when the pole ‚ ⊆ Λ×Π is not empty, we can observe that:
Fact 2.36. Given a fixed (t0, pi0) ∈‚, we have kpi0t0  a for all a ∈ A .
so that any element of the implicative structure is actually realized by some K-term
(which does not even depend on the considered element of A ). This is the reason why
Krivine introduces an extra parameter, the set of proof-like (K)-terms PL ⊆ Λ, whose
elements are (by convention) the realizers that are considered as valid certificates of the
truth of a formula. (The terminology ‘proof-like’ comes from the fact that all realizers
that come from actual proofs belong to the subset PL ⊆ Λ.)
Following Krivine, we say that a truth value a ∈ A is realized when it is realized by a
proof-like term, that is:
a realized :⇔ ∃t ∈ PL, t  a
⇔ a‚ ∩ PL 6= ∅
More generally, we say that the abstract Krivine structure K = (Λ,Π, . . . ,PL,‚) is
consistent when the smallest truth value ⊥ = Π is not realized, that is:
K consistent :⇔ Π‚ ∩ PL = ∅ .
We now need to check that Krivine’s notion of consistency is consistent with the
one that comes with implicative structures (Def. 2.28). For that, we call a closed clas-
sical combinatory term any closed λ-term with cc that is either K (= λxy . x), either
S (= λxyz . xz(yz)), either the constant cc, or the application t1t2 of two closed clas-
sical combinatory terms t1 and t2. Each closed classical combinatory term t with cc is
naturally interpreted by an element tΛ ∈ Λ that is recursively defined by:
KΛ := K, SΛ := S, ccΛ := cc and (t1t2)
Λ := tΛ1 t
Λ
2 .
From the closure properties of the set PL of proof-like terms, it is clear that tΛ ∈ PL for
each closed classical combinatory term t. Moreover:
Lemma 2.37. For each closed classical combinatory term t, we have: tΛ  tA .
Proof. By induction on t, distinguishing the following cases:
• t = K,S, cc. In this case, combining standard results of classical realizability (Kriv-
‖ This is why sets of stacks are sometimes called falsity values, as in (Miquel, 2010; Miquel, 2011).
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ine, 2011) with the properties of implicative structures, we get:
KΛ = K 
k
a,b∈A
(a→ b→ a) = KA
SΛ = S 
k
a,b,c∈A
((a→ b→ c)→ (a→ b)→ a→ c) = SA
ccΛ = cc 
k
a,b∈A
(((a→ b)→ a)→ a) = ccA
(by Prop. 2.24)
(by Prop. 2.24)
(by definition)
• t = t1t2, where t1, t2 are closed classical combinatory terms. In this case, we have
tΛ1  tA1 and tΛ2  tA2 by IH. And since tA1 4 (tA2 → tA1 tA2 ) (from Prop. 2.12 (3)), we
also have tΛ1  tA2 → tA1 tA2 (by subtyping), so that we get tΛ = tΛ1 tΛ2  tA1 tA2 = tA
(by modus ponens).
We can now conclude:
Proposition 2.38. If an abstract Krivine structure K = (Λ,Π, . . . ,PL,‚) is consis-
tent (in the sense that Π‚ ∩ PL = ∅), then the induced implicative structure A =
(P(Π),⊇,→) is classically consistent (in the sense of Def. 2.28).
Proof. Let us assume that Π‚ ∩PL = ∅. Given a closed λ-term t with cc, there exists
a closed classical combinatory term t0 such that t0 β t. So that we have tΛ0  tA0 (by
Lemma 2.37) and tA0 4 tA (by Prop. 2.18), hence tΛ0  tA (by subtyping). But this
implies that tA 6= ⊥ (= Π), since tΛ ∈ (tA )‚ ∩ PL 6= ∅.
Note that the converse implication does not hold in general. The reason is that the
criterion of consistency for the considered abstract Krivine structure depends both on
the pole ‚ and on the conventional set PL of proof-like terms. (In particular, it should
be clear to the reader that the larger the set PL, the stronger the corresponding criterion
of consistency.) On the other hand, the construction of the induced implicative structure
A = (P(Π),⊇,→) does not depend on the set PL, so that the criterion of classical
consistency of Def. 2.28—that does not depend on PL either—can only be regarded as a
minimal criterion of consistency.
In order to reflect more faithfully Krivine’s notion of consistency at the level of the
induced implicative structure, it is now time to introduce the last ingredient of implicative
algebras: the notion of separator.
3. Separation
3.1. Separators and implicative algebras
Let A = (A ,4,→) be an implicative structure.
Definition 3.1 (Separator). We call a separator of A any subset S ⊆ A that fulfills
the following conditions for all a, b ∈ A :
(1) If a ∈ S and a 4 b, then b ∈ S (S is upwards closed)
(2) KA = (λxy . x)A ∈ S and SA = (λxyz . xz(yz))A ∈ S (S contains K and S)
(3) If (a→ b) ∈ S and a ∈ S, then b ∈ S (S is closed under modus ponens)
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A separator S ⊆ A is said to be:
— consistent when ⊥ /∈ S;
— classical when ccA ∈ S.
Remark 3.2. In the presence of condition (1) (upwards closure), condition (3) (closure
under modus ponens) is actually equivalent to:
(3′) If a, b ∈ S, then ab ∈ S (closure under application)
Proof. Let S ⊆ A be an upwards closed subset of A .
• (3)⇒ (3′) Suppose that a, b ∈ S. Since a 4 (b→ ab) (from Prop. 2.12 (3)), we get
(b→ ab) ∈ S by upwards closure, hence ab ∈ S by (3).
• (3′) ⇒ (3) Suppose that (a → b), a ∈ S. By (3′) we have (a → b)a ∈ S, and since
(a→ b)a 4 b (from Prop. 2.12 (2)), we get b ∈ S by upwards closure.
Intuitively, each separator S ⊆ A defines a particular ‘criterion of truth’ within the
implicative structure A = (A ,4,→). In implicative structures, separators play the very
same role as filters in Heyting algebras, and it is easy to check that:
Proposition 3.3 (Separators in a complete Heyting algebra). If A = (A ,4,→)
is a complete Heyting algebra, then a subset S ⊆ A is a separator (in the sense of
implicative structures) if and only if S is a filter (in the sense of Heyting algebras).
Proof. Indeed, when the implicative structure A = (A ,4,→) is a complete Heyting
algebra, the conditions (1), (2) and (3′) defining separators simplify to:
(1) If a ∈ S and a 4 b, then b ∈ S (upwards closure)
(2) > (= KA = SA ) ∈ S (from Prop. 2.21)
(3′) If a, b ∈ S, then auprise b (= ab) ∈ S (from Coro. 2.13)
which is precisely the definition of the notion of a filter.
However, separators are in general not filters, since they are not closed under binary
meets (i.e. a ∈ S and b ∈ S do not necessarily imply that a uprise b ∈ S). Actually, one of
the key ideas we shall develop in the rest of this paper is that the difference between
(intuitionistic or classical) realizability and forcing (in the sense of Kripke or Cohen) lies
precisely in the difference between separators and filters.
Proposition 3.4. If S ⊆ A is a separator, then for all λ-terms t with free variables
x1, . . . , xn and for all parameters a1, . . . , an ∈ S, we have:
(t{x1 := a1, . . . , xn := an})A ∈ S .
In particular, for all closed λ-terms t, we have tA ∈ S.
Proof. Let t be a λ-term with free variables x1, . . . , xn, and let a1, . . . , an be parameters
taken in S. From the theory of the λ-calculus, there exists a closed combinatory term t0
such that t0 β λx1 · · ·xn . t. It is clear that tA0 a1 · · · an ∈ S from the conditions (2) and
(3′) on the separator S. Moreover, by Prop. 2.18 we have
tA0 a1 · · · an 4 (λx1 · · ·xn . t)A a1 · · · an 4 (t{x1 := a1, . . . , xn := an})A ,
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so that we get (t{x1 := a1, . . . , xn := an})A ∈ S, by upwards closure.
Definition 3.5 (Implicative algebra). We call an implicative algebra any implica-
tive structure (A ,4,→) equipped with a separator S ⊆ A . An implicative algebra
(A ,4,→, S) is said to be consistent (resp. classical) when the underlying separator
S ⊆ A is consistent (resp. classical).
3.2. Examples
3.2.1. Complete Heyting algebras We have seen that a complete Heyting algebra (H,4)
can be seen as an implicative structure (H,4,→) where implication is defined by:
a→ b := max{c ∈ H : (cuprise a) 4 b} (for all a, b ∈ H)
The complete Heyting algebra (H,4) can also be seen as an implicative algebra, by
endowing it with the trivial separator S = {>} (i.e. the smallest filter of H).
3.2.2. Implicative algebras of intuitionistic realizability Let (P, · , k, s) be a (total) combi-
natory algebra. In section 2.7.1, we have seen that such a structure induces an implicative
structure (P(P ),⊆→) whose implication is defined by:
a→ b := {z ∈ P : ∀x ∈ a, z · x ∈ b} (for all a, b ∈ P(P ))
The above implicative structure is naturally turned into an implicative algebra by en-
dowing it with the separator S = P(P ) \ {∅} formed by all truth values that contain at
least a realizer. In this case, the separator S = P(P ) \ {∅} is not only consistent (in the
sense of Def. 3.1), but it is also a maximal separator (see Section 3.6 below).
Remark 3.6. In an arbitrary implicative structure (A ,4,→), we can observe that the
subset A \ {⊥} ⊂ A is in general not a separator. (Counter-example: consider the
Boolean algebra with 4 elements.) The property that A \ {⊥} is a separator is thus a
specific property of the implicative structures induced by (total) combinatory algebras,
and the existence of such a separator that is trivially consistent explains why there is no
need to introduce a notion of proof-like term in intuitionistic realizability.
3.2.3. Implicative algebras of classical realizability Let
K = (Λ,Π,@, · , k , K, S, cc,PL,‚)
be an abstract Krivine structure (Def. 2.33 p. 18). We have seen (Section 2.7.2) that such
a structure induces an implicative structure (A ,4,→) where:
• A := P(Π);
• a 4 b :⇔ a ⊇ b (for all a, b ∈ A )
• a→ b := a‚ · b = {t · pi : t ∈ a‚, pi ∈ b} (for all a, b ∈ A )
Using the set PL of proof-like terms, we can now turn the former implicative structure
into an implicative algebra (A ,4,→, S), letting:
S := {a ∈ A : a‚ ∩ PL 6= ∅} .
Alexandre Miquel 24
Proposition 3.7. The subset S = {a ∈ A : a‚ ∩PL 6= ∅} ⊆ A is a classical separator
of the implicative structure (A ,4,→).
Proof. By construction, we have S = {a ∈ A : ∃t ∈ PL, t  a}.
(1) Upwards closure: obvious, by subtyping.
(2) We have seen in Section 2.7.2 (Proof of Lemma 2.37) that K  KA , S  SA and
cc  ccA , and since K, S, cc ∈ PL, we get KA ,SA , ccA ∈ S.
(3) Suppose that (a→ b), a ∈ S. From the definition of S, we have t  a→ b and u  a
for some t, u ∈ PL, so that tu  b, where tu ∈ PL. Hence b ∈ S.
Moreover, it is obvious that:
Proposition 3.8 (Consistency). The classical implicative algebra (A ,4,→, S) in-
duced by the abstract Krivine structure K = (Λ,Π, . . . ,PL,‚) is consistent (in the sense
of Def. 3.5) if and only if K is consistent (in the sense that Π‚ ∩ PL = ∅).
Proof. Indeed, we have ⊥ /∈ S iff ⊥‚ ∩ PL = ∅, that is: iff Π‚ ∩ PL = ∅.
3.3. Generating separators
Let A = (A ,4,→) be an implicative structure. For each subset X ⊆ A , we write:
• ↑X = {a ∈ A : ∃a0 ∈ X, a0 4 a} the upwards closure of X in A ;
• @(X) the applicative closure of X, defined as the smallest subset of A containing X
(as a subset) and closed under application;
• Λ(X) the λ-closure of X, formed by all elements a ∈ A that can be written a =
(t{x1 := a1, . . . , xn := an})A for some pure λ-term t with free variables x1, . . . , xn
and for some parameters a1, . . . , an ∈ X.
Note that in general, the sets @(X) and Λ(X) are not upwards closed, but we obviously
have the inclusion @(X) ⊆ Λ(X).
Proposition 3.9 (Generated separator). Given any subset X ⊆ A we have:
↑Λ(X) = ↑@(X ∪ {KA ,SA }) .
By construction, the above set is the smallest separator of A that contains X as a subset;
it is called the separator generated by X, and written Sep(X).
Proof. The inclusion ↑@(X ∪ {KA ,SA }) ⊆ ↑Λ(X) is obvious, and the converse in-
clusion follows from Prop. 2.18 using the fact each λ-term is the β-contracted of some
combinatory term constructed from variables, K, S and application. The set ↑Λ(X) is
clearly a separator (closure under application follows from Prop. 2.12 (1)), and from
Prop. 3.4, it is included in any separator containing X as a subset.
An important property of first-order logic is the deduction lemma, which states that
an implication φ⇒ ψ is provable in a theory T if and only if the formula ψ is provable in
the theory T +φ that is obtained by enriching T with the axiom φ. Viewing separators
S ⊆ A as theories, this naturally suggests the following semantic counterpart:
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Lemma 3.10 (Deduction in a separator). For each separator S ⊆ A , we have
(a→ b) ∈ S iff b ∈ Sep(S ∪ {a}) (for all a, b ∈ A )
Proof. Suppose that (a → b) ∈ S. Then (a → b) ∈ Sep(S ∪ {a}) (by inclusion),
and since a ∈ Sep(S ∪ {a}) (by construction), we get b ∈ Sep(S ∪ {a}) (by modus
ponens). Conversely, let us suppose that b ∈ Sep(S ∪ {a}). From the definition of the
separator Sep(S∪{a}), this means that there are a λ-term t with free variables x1, . . . , xn
and parameters a1, . . . , an ∈ S ∪ {a} such that (t{x1 := a1, . . . , xn := an})A 4 b.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that a1 = a and a2, . . . , an ∈ S (with n ≥ 1).
Letting c := (λx1 . t{x2 := a2, . . . , xn := an})A , we observe that c ∈ S, by Prop. 3.4.
Moreover, we have ca 4 (t{x1 := a1, x2 := a2, . . . , xn := an})A 4 b by Prop 2.18. And
by adjunction, we deduce that c 4 (a→ b), hence (a→ b) ∈ S.
In what follows, we shall say that a separator S ⊆ A is finitely generated when
S = Sep(X) for some finite subset X ⊆ A . Two important examples of finitely generated
separators of an implicative structure A = (A ,4,→) are:
— the intuitionistic core of A , defined by S 0J (A ) := Sep(∅);
— the classical core of A , defined by S 0K(A ) := Sep({ccA }).
By definition, the set S 0J (A ) (resp. S
0
K(A )) is the smallest separator (resp. the smallest
classical separator) of A ; and from Prop. 3.9, it is clear that the implicative structure
A = (A ,4,→) is intuitionistically consistent (resp. classically consistent) in the sense
of Def. 2.28 if and only if ⊥ /∈ S 0J (A ) (resp. ⊥ /∈ S 0K(A )).
3.4. Interpreting first-order logic
3.4.1. Conjunction and disjunction Each implicative structure A = (A ,4,→) describes
a particular logic from the interaction between implication a → b and universal quan-
tification, seen as a meet w.r.t. the ordering a 4 b of subtyping. In such a framework,
conjunction (notation: a×b) and disjunction (notation: a+b) are naturally defined using
the standard encodings of minimal second-order logic (Girard, 1972; Girard et al., 1989):
a× b :=
k
c∈A
((a→ b→ c)→ c)
a+ b :=
k
c∈A
((a→ c)→ (b→ c)→ c)
Finally, negation and logical equivalence are defined as expected, letting ¬a := (a→ ⊥)
and a↔ b := (a→ b)× (b→ a). We easily check that:
Proposition 3.11. When (A ,4,→) is a complete Heyting algebra:
a× b = auprise b and a+ b = ag b (for all a, b ∈ A )
(The proof is left as an exercise to the reader.)
In the general case, the introduction and elimination rules of conjunction and disjunc-
tion are naturally expressed as semantic typing rules (see Section 2.5) using the very
same proof-terms as in Curry-style system F (Leivant, 1983; van Bakel et al., 1994):
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Proposition 3.12 (Typing rules for × and +). The semantic typing rules
Γ ` t : a Γ ` u : b
Γ ` λz . z t u : a× b
Γ ` t : a× b
Γ ` t (λxy . x) : a
Γ ` t : a× b
Γ ` t (λxy . y) : b
Γ ` t : a
Γ ` λzw . z t : a+ b
Γ ` t : b
Γ ` λzw .w t : a+ b
Γ ` t : a+ b Γ, x : a ` u : c Γ, y : b ` v : c
Γ ` t (λx . u) (λy . v) : c
are valid in any implicative structure.
(Recall that Γ ` t : a means: FV (t) ⊆ dom(Γ) and (t[Γ])A 4 a.)
Moreover, we can notice that via the interpretation t 7→ tA of pure λ-terms into the
implicative structure A (Section 2.4), the pairing construct 〈t, u〉 := λz . z t u appears to
be the same as conjunction itself:
Proposition 3.13. For all a, b ∈ A : 〈a, b〉A = (λz . z a b)A = a× b.
Proof. Same proof technique as for Prop. 2.24.
3.4.2. Quantifiers In any implicative structure A = (A ,4,→), the universal quantifi-
cation of a family of truth values (ai)i∈I ∈ A I is naturally defined as its meet:
∀
i∈I
ai :=
k
i∈I
ai .
It is obvious that:
Proposition 3.14 (Rules for ∀). The following semantic typing rules
Γ ` t : ai (for all i ∈ I)
Γ ` t : ∀i∈I ai
Γ ` t : ∀i∈I ai
Γ ` t : ai0
(i0 ∈ I)
are valid in any implicative structure.
In such a framework, it would be quite natural to define existential quantification du-
ally, that is: as a join. Alas, this interpretation does not fulfill (in general) the elimination
rule for ∃—remember that joins only exist by accident. As for conjunction and disjunc-
tion, we shall use the corresponding encoding in second-order minimal logic (Girard,
1972; Girard et al., 1989), letting:
∃
i∈I
ai :=
k
c∈A
(k
i∈I
(ai → c) → c
)
.
Again, we easily check that:
Proposition 3.15. When (A ,4,→) is a complete Heyting algebra:
∃
i∈I
ai =
j
i∈I
ai (for all (ai)i∈I ∈ A I)
Coming back to the general case:
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Proposition 3.16 (Rules for ∃). The following semantic typing rules
Γ ` t : ai0
Γ ` λz . z t : ∃i∈I ai (i0 ∈ I)
Γ ` t : ∃i∈I ai Γ, x : ai ` u : c (for all i ∈ I)
Γ ` t (λx . u) : c
are valid in any implicative structure.
3.4.3. Leibniz equality Given any two objects α and β, the identity of α and β (in the
sense of Leibniz) is expressed by the truth value idA (α, β) ∈ A defined by:
idA (α, β) :=
{
IA if α = β
> → ⊥ if α 6= β
It is a straightforward exercise to check that when α and β belong to a given set M , the
above interpretation of Leibniz equality amounts to the usual second-order encoding:
Proposition 3.17. For all sets M and for all α, β ∈M , we have:
idA (α, β) =
k
p∈AM
(p(α)→ p(β)) .
Moreover:
Proposition 3.18 (Rules for idA ). Given a set M , a function p : M → A and two
objects α, β ∈M , the following semantic typing rules are valid:
Γ ` λx . x : α = α
Γ ` t : idA (α, β) Γ ` u : p(α)
Γ ` t u : p(β)
3.4.4. Interpreting a first-order language LetA = (A ,4,→) be an implicative structure.
An A -valued interpretation of a first-order language L is defined by:
— a domain of interpretation M 6= ∅;
— an M -valued function fM : Mk →M for each k-ary function symbol of L ;
— a truth-value function pA : Mk → A for each k-ary predicate symbol of L .
As usual, we call a term with parameters in M (resp. a formula with parameters in M)
any first-order term (resp. any formula) of the first-order language L enriched with
constant symbols taken in M . Each closed term t with parameters in M is naturally
interpreted as the element tM ∈M defined from the equations
aM = a (if a is a parameter) f(t1, . . . , tk)
M = fM (tM1 , . . . , t
M
k )
whereas each closed formula φ with parameters in M is interpreted as the truth value
φA ∈ A defined from the equations:
(t1 = t2)
A := idA (tM1 , t
M
2 ) (p(t1, . . . , tk))
A := pA (tM1 , . . . , t
M
k )
(φ⇒ ψ)A := φA → ψA (¬φ)A := φA → ⊥
(φ ∧ ψ)A := φA × ψA (φ ∨ ψ)A := φA + ψA
(∀xφ(x))A := ∀
α∈M
(φ(α))A (∀xφ(x))A := ∃
α∈M
(φ(α))A
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Proposition 3.19 (Soundness). If a closed formula φ of the language L is an intu-
itionistic tautology (resp. a classical tautology), then
φA ∈ S 0J (A ) (resp. φA ∈ S 0K(A ))
where S 0J (A ) (resp. S
0
K(A )) is the intuitionistic core (resp. the classical core) of A .
Proof. By induction on the derivation d of the formula φ (in natural deduction), we
construct a closed λ-term t (possibly containing the constant cc when the derivation d is
classical) such that ` t : φA , using the semantic typing rules given in Prop. 2.23, 3.12,
3.14, 3.16 and 3.18. So that tA 4 φA . We conclude by Prop. 3.4.
3.5. Entailment and the induced Heyting algebra
Let (A ,4,→) be an implicative structure. Each separator S ⊆ A induces a binary
relation of entailment, written a `S b and defined by
a `S b :⇔ (a→ b) ∈ S (for all a, b ∈ A )
Proposition 3.20. The relation a `S b is a preorder on A .
Proof. Reflexivity: given a ∈ A , we have IA 4 (a→ a) ∈ S. Transitivity: given a, b, c ∈
A such that (a → b) ∈ S and (b → c) ∈ S, we observe that BA = (λxyz . x(yz))A 4
(b→ c)→ (a→ b)→ a→ c ∈ S, hence (a→ c) ∈ S, by modus ponens.
In what follows, we shall write A /S = (A /S,≤S) the poset reflection of the pre-
ordered set (A ,`S), where:
• A /S := A /a`S is the quotient of A by the equivalence relation a a`S b induced by
the preorder a `S b, which is defined by:
a a`S b :⇔ (a→ b) ∈ S ∧ (b→ a) ∈ S (for all a, b ∈ A )
• α ≤S β is the order induced by the preorder a `S b in the quotient set A /S, which
is characterized by:
[a] ≤S [b] ⇔ a `S b (for all a, b ∈ A )
writing [a], [b] the equivalence classes of a, b ∈ A in the quotient A /S.
Proposition 3.21 (Induced Heyting algebra). For each separator S ⊆ A , the poset
reflection H := (A /S,≤S) of the pre-ordered set (A ,`S) is a Heyting algebra whose
operations are given for all a, b ∈ A by:
[a]→H [b] = [a→ b]
[a] ∧H [b] = [a× b] >H = [>] = S
[a] ∨H [b] = [a+ b] ⊥H = [⊥] = {c ∈ A : (¬c) ∈ S}
(writing [a] the equivalence class of a). If, moreover, the separator S ⊆ A is classical,
then the induced Heyting algebra H = (A /S,≤S) is a Boolean algebra.
In what follows, the quotient poset H := (A /S,≤S) is called the Heyting algebra
induced by the implicative algebra (A ,4,→, S).
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Proof. Given a, b ∈ A , we observe the following:
• For all c ∈ A , we have IA 4 (⊥ → c) ∈ S, hence [⊥] ≤S [c].
• For all c ∈ A , we have (c→ >) = > ∈ S, hence [c] ≤S [>].
• (λz . z (λxy . x))A 4 (a × b → a) ∈ S and (λz . z (λxy . y))A 4 (a × b → b), hence
[a × b] ≤S [a] and [a × b] ≤S [b]. Conversely, if c ∈ A is such that [c] ≤S [a] and
[c] ≤S [b], we have (c→ a) ∈ S and (c→ b) ∈ S. From Prop. 3.4 and Prop. 2.12 (2),
we get (λzw .w ((c → a) z) ((c → b) z))A 4 (c → a × b) ∈ S, hence [c] ≤S [a × b].
Therefore: [a× b] = infH([a], [b]) = [a] ∧H [b].
• (λxzw . z x)A 4 (a → a + b) ∈ S and (λyzw .w y)A 4 (b → a + b) ∈ S, hence
[a] ≤S [a + b] and [b] ≤S [a + b]. Conversely, if c ∈ A is such that [a] ≤S [c]
and [b] ≤S [c], we have (a → c) ∈ S and (b → c) ∈ S. From Prop. 3.4 we get
(λz . z (a → c) (b → c))A 4 (a + b → c) ∈ S, hence [a + b] ≤S [c]. Therefore:
[a+ b] = supH([a], [b]) = [a] ∨H [b].
• For all c ∈ A , we have (λwz . z w)A 4 ((c → a → b) → c × a → b) ∈ S and
(λwxy .w 〈x, y〉)A 4 ((c × a → b) → c → a → b) ∈ S. Hence the equivalence
(c → a → b) ∈ S iff (c × a → b) ∈ S, that is: [c] ≤S [a → b] iff [c × a] ≤S [b].
Therefore: [a→ b] = max{γ ∈ H : γ ∧H [a] ≤S [b]} = [a]→H [b].
So that the poset (A /S,≤S) is a Heyting algebra. If, moreover, the separator S ⊆ A
is classical, then we have ccA 4 (¬¬a → a) ∈ S for all a ∈ A , so that ¬H¬H [a] =
[¬¬a] ≤S [a], which means that (A /S,≤S) is a Boolean algebra.
Remarks 3.22. (1) In the particular case where (A ,4,→) is a complete Heyting
algebra (Section 2.2.1), the separator S ⊆ A is a filter, and the above construction
amounts to the usual construction of the quotient A /S in Heyting algebras.
(2) Coming back to the general framework of implicative structures, it is clear that
the induced Heyting algebra H = (A /S,≤S) is non-degenerated (i.e. [>] 6= [⊥]) if and
only if the separator S ⊆ A is consistent (i.e. ⊥ /∈ S).
(3) When the separator S ⊆ A is classical (i.e. when ccA ∈ S), the induced Heyting
algebra is a Boolean algebra. The converse implication does not hold in general, and we
shall see a counter-example in Section 3.6 below (Remark 3.26).
(4) In general, the induced Heyting algebra (A /S,≤S) is not complete—so that it is
not an implicative structure either. A simple counter-example is given by the complete
Boolean algebra P(ω) (which is also an implicative structure) equipped with the Fre´chet
filter F = {a ∈ P(ω) : a cofinite} (which is also a classical separator of P(ω)), since the
quotient Boolean algebra P(ω)/F is not complete (Koppelberg, 1989, Chap. 2, § 5.5).
3.6. Ultraseparators
Let A = (A ,4,→) be an implicative structure. Although the separators of A are in
general not filters, they can be manipulated similarly to filters. By analogy with the
notion of ultrafilter, we define the notion of ultraseparator:
Definition 3.23 (Ultraseparator). We call an ultraseparator of A any separator S ⊆
A that is both consistent and maximal among consistent separators (w.r.t. ⊆).
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From Zorn’s lemma, it is clear that:
Lemma 3.24. For each consistent separator S0 ⊆ A , there exists an ultraseparator
S ⊆ A such that S0 ⊆ S.
Proposition 3.25. For each separator S ⊆ A , the following are equivalent:
(1) S is an ultraseparator of A .
(2) The induced Heyting algebra (A /S,≤S) is the 2-element Boolean algebra.
Proof. (1)⇒ (2) Assume that S ⊆ A is an ultraseparator. Since S is consistent, we
have ⊥ /∈ S and thus [⊥] 6= [>] (= S). Now, take a0 ∈ A such that [a0] 6= [⊥], and
let S′ = {a ∈ A : [a0] ≤S [a]} = {a ∈ A : (a0 → a) ∈ S} be the preimage of the
principal filter ↑[a0] ⊆ A /S via the canonical surjection [ · ] : A → A /S. Clearly, the
subset S′ ⊆ A is a consistent separator such that S ⊆ S′ and a0 ∈ S′. By maximality,
we have S′ = S, so that a0 ∈ S and thus [a0] = [>]. Therefore, A /S = {[⊥], [>]} is the
2-element Heyting algebra, that is also a Boolean algebra.
(2) ⇒ (1) Let us assume that A /S is the 2-element Boolean algebra (so that A /S =
{[⊥], [>]}), and consider a consistent separator S′ ⊆ A such that S ⊆ S′. For all a ∈ S′,
we have ¬a /∈ S (otherwise, we would have a,¬a ∈ S′, and thus ⊥ ∈ S′), hence a /∈ [⊥]
and thus a ∈ [>] = S. Therefore, S′ = S.
Remark 3.26. It is important to notice that a maximal separator is not necessarily
classical, although the induced Heyting algebra is always the trivial Boolean algebra.
Indeed, we have seen in Section 3.2.2 that any total combinatory algebra (P, · , k, s)
induces an implicative algebra (A ,4,→, S) = (P(P ),⊆,→,P(P )\{∅}) whose separator
S := P(P )\{∅} = A \{⊥} is obviously an ultraseparator. But when the set P has more
than one element, it is easy to check that
ccA 4
k
a∈A
(¬¬a→ a) = ⊥ (= ∅)
so that ccA = ⊥ /∈ S. On the other hand, the induced Heyting algebra A /S is the
trivial Boolean algebra, which corresponds to the well-known fact that, in intuitionistic
realizability, one of both formulas φ and ¬φ is realized for each closed formula φ. So
that all the closed instances of the law of excluded middle are actually realized. Of
course, this does not imply that the law of excluded middle itself—that holds for all
open formulas—is (uniformly) realized. By the way, this example also shows that a non-
classical separator S ⊆ A may induce a Boolean algebra (see Remark 3.22 (3)).
3.7. Separators, filters and non-deterministic choice
As filters, separators are upwards closed and nonempty, but they are not closed under bi-
nary meets in general. In this section, we shall now study the particular case of separators
that happen to be filters.
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3.7.1. Non-deterministic choice Given an implicative structure A = (A ,4,→), we let:
tA := (λxy . x)A uprise (λxy . y)A =
k
a,b∈A
(a→ b→ auprise b) .
By construction, we have:
tA a b 4 a and tA a b 4 b (for all a, b ∈ A )
so that we can think of tA as the non-deterministic choice operator (in A ), that takes
two arguments a, b ∈ A and returns a or b in an non-deterministic way††.
From the point of view of logic, recall that the meet a uprise b of two elements a, b ∈ A
can be seen as a strong form of conjunction. Indeed, it is clear that
(λxz . z x x)A 4 (auprise b→ a× b) ∈ S
for all separators S ⊆ A and for all a, b ∈ A , so that we have a uprise b `S a × b. Seen
as a type, the non-deterministic choice operator tA =
c
a,b(a → b → a uprise b) precisely
expresses the converse implication, and we easily check that:
Proposition 3.27 (Characterizing filters). For all separators S ⊆ A , the following
assertions are equivalent:
(1) tA ∈ S;
(2) [auprise b]/S = [a× b]/S for all a, b ∈ A ;
(3) S is a filter (w.r.t. the ordering 4).
Proof. (1)⇒ (2) For all a, b ∈ A , it is clear that [aupriseb]/S ≤S [a×b]/S . And from (1),
we get
(
λz . z tA
)A 4 (a× b→ auprise b) ∈ S, hence [a× b]/S ≤S [auprise b]/S .
(2) ⇒ (3) Let us assume that a, b ∈ S. We have [a]/S = [b]/S = [>]/S , so that by (2)
we get [auprise b]/S = [a× b]/S = [>×>]/S = [>]/S . Therefore (auprise b) ∈ S.
(3) ⇒ (1) It is clear that (λxy . x)A ∈ S and (λxy . y)A ∈ S, so that from (3) we get
tA = (λxy . x)A uprise (λxy . y)A ∈ S.
3.7.2. Non-deterministic choice and induction In second-order logic (Girard et al., 1989;
Krivine, 1993), the predicate N(x) expressing that a given individual x is a natural
number‡‡ is given by:
N(x) := ∀Z (Z(0)⇒ ∀y (Z(y)⇒ Z(y + 1))⇒ Z(x)) .
In intuitionistic realizability (van Oosten, 2008; Krivine, 1993) as in classical realiz-
ability (Krivine, 2009), it is well-known that the (unrelativized) induction principle
†† In classical realizability, it can be shown (Guillermo and Miquel, 2015) that the universal realizers of
the second-order formula ∀α∀β (α → β → α ∩ β) (where α ∩ β denotes the intersection of α and β)
are precisely the closed terms t with the non-deterministic computational rules t ? u · v · pi  u ? pi
and t ? u · v · pi  v ? pi for all closed terms u, v and for all stacks pi. Recall that Krivine’s abstract
machine (Krivine, 2009) can be extended with extra instructions at will (for instance: an instruction
t with the aforementioned non-deterministic behavior), so that such realizers may potentially exist.
‡‡ Here, we recognize Dedekind’s construction of natural numbers, as the elements of a fixed Dedekind-
infinite set that are reached by the induction principle (seen as a local property).
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Ind := ∀x N(x) is not realized in general, even when individuals are interpreted by
natural numbers in the model. (Technically, this is the reason why uniform quantifica-
tions over the set of natural numbers need to be replaced by quantifications relativized
to the predicate N(x).)
In any implicative structure A = (A ,4,→), the syntactic predicate N(x) is naturally
interpreted by the semantic predicate NA : ω → A defined by
NA (n) :=
k
a∈A ω
(
a0 →
k
i∈ω
(
ai → ai+1
)
→ an
)
(for all n ∈ ω)
while the (unrelativized) induction scheme is interpreted by the truth value
IndA :=
k
n∈ω
NA (n) .
The following proposition states that the unrelativized induction scheme IndA and the
non-deterministic choice operator tA are intuitionistically equivalent in A :
Proposition 3.28. IndA a`S0J (A ) t
A (where S 0J (A ) is the intuitionistic core of A ).
Proof. (IndA `S0J (A ) t
A ) Given a, b ∈ A , we let c0 = a and cn = b for all n ≥ 1.
From an obvious argument of subtyping, we get
IndA 4
k
n∈ω
(
c0 →
k
i∈ω
(
ci → ci+1
)
→ cn
)
= a→ ((a→ b)uprise (b→ b))→ auprise b
so that (λnxy . n x (K y))A 4 (IndA → a → b → a uprise b). Now taking the meet for all
a, b ∈ A , we thus get (λnxy . n x (K y))A 4 (IndA → tA ) ∈ S 0J (A ).
(tA `S0J (A ) Ind
A ) Consider the following pure λ-terms:
zero := λxy . x
succ := λnxy . y (nx y)
Y := (λyf . f (y y f)) (λyf . f (y y f))
t[x] := Y (λr . x zero (succ r))
(here, Y is Turing’s fixpoint combinator). From the typing rules of Prop. 2.23, we easily
check that zeroA 4 N(0) and succA 4 N(n) → N(n + 1) for all n ∈ ω. Now, consider
the element Θ :=
(
t[tA ]
)A ∈ A . From the reduction rule of Y, we get
Θ 4 tA zeroA (succAΘ) 4 zeroA uprise succAΘ .
By a straightforward induction on n, we deduce that Θ 4 N(n) for all n ∈ ω, hence
Θ 4 IndA . Therefore: (λx . t[x])A 4 (tA → Θ) 4 (tA → IndA ) ∈ S 0J (A ).
3.7.3. Non-deterministic choice and the parallel-or A variant of the non-deterministic
choice operator is the parallel ‘or’, that is defined by:
p-orA := (⊥ → > → ⊥)uprise (> → ⊥ → ⊥) .
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Intuitively, the parallel ‘or’ is a function that takes two arguments—one totally defined
and the other one totally undefined—and returns the most defined of both, indepen-
dently from the order in which both arguments were passed to the function. (Recall that
according to the definitional ordering a v b :⇔ a < b, the element ⊥ represents the
totally defined object whereas > represents the totally undefined object.)
We observe that
tA =
k
a,b∈A
(a→ b→ auprise b) 4 (⊥ → > → ⊥)uprise (> → ⊥ → ⊥) ,
which means that the parallel ‘or’ p-orA is a super-type of the non-deterministic choice
operator tA . However, both operators are classically equivalent:
Proposition 3.29. p-orA a`S0K(A ) t
A (where S 0K(A ) is the classical core of A ).
Proof. (tA `S0K(A ) p-orA ) Obvious, by subtyping.
(p-orA `S0K(A ) t
A ) Let t := λzxy . cc (λk . z (k x) (k y)). From the semantic typing
rules of Prop. 2.23 (and from the type of cc) we easily check that
tA 4 (p-orA → a→ b→ a) and tA 4 (p-orA → a→ b→ b)
for all a, b ∈ A , hence tA 4 (p-orA → tA ) ∈ S 0K(A ).
3.7.4. The case of finitely generated separators In Prop. 3.27 above, we have seen that
a separator S ⊆ A is a filter if and only if it contains the non-deterministic choice
operator tA . In the particular case where the separator S ⊆ A is finitely generated (see
Section 3.3), the situation is even more dramatic:
Proposition 3.30. Given a separator S ⊆ A , the following are equivalent:
(1) S is finitely generated and tA ∈ S.
(2) S is a principal filter of A : S = ↑{Θ} for some Θ ∈ S.
(3) The induced Heyting algebra (A /S,≤S) is complete and the canonical surjection
[ · ]/S : A → A /S commutes with arbitrary meets:[k
i∈I
ai
]
/S
=
∧
i∈I
[ai]/S (for all (ai)i∈I ∈ A I)
Proof. (1) ⇒ (2) Let us assume that S = ↑@({g1, . . . , gn}) for some g1, . . . , gn ∈ S
(see Section 3.3, Prop. 3.9), and tA ∈ S. From the latter assumption, we know (by
Prop. 3.27) that S is closed under all finite meets, so that for all k ≥ 1, we have:
tAk :=
k
i=1
(λx1 · · ·xk . xi)A =
k
a1,...,ak∈A
(a1 → · · · → ak → a1 uprise · · ·uprise ak) ∈ S .
Let Θ :=
(
Y (λr .tAn+1g1 · · · gn (r r))
)A
, where Y := (λyf . f (y y f)) (λyf . f (y y f)) is
Turing’s fixpoint combinator. Since g1, . . . , gn,tAn+1 ∈ S, it is clear that Θ ∈ S. From
the evaluation rule of Y, we have Θ 4 tAn+1g1 · · · gn (ΘΘ) 4 g1 uprise · · · uprise gn uprise ΘΘ,
hence Θ 4 gi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and Θ 4 ΘΘ. By a straightforward induction, we
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deduce that Θ 4 a for all a ∈ @({g1, . . . , gn}) (recall that the latter set is generated from
g1, . . . , gn by application), and thus Θ 4 a for all a ∈ ↑@({g1, . . . , gn}) = S (by upwards
closure). Therefore: Θ = min(S) and S = ↑{Θ} (since S is upwards closed).
(2) ⇒ (3) Let us assume that S = ↑{Θ} for some Θ ∈ S. Let (αi)i∈I ∈ (A /S)I be
a family of equivalence classes indexed by an arbitrary set I, and (ai)i∈I ∈
∏
i∈I αi a
system of representatives. Since
(c
i∈I ai
)
4 ai for all i ∈ I, we have
[c
i∈I ai
]
/S
≤S αi
for all i ∈ I, hence [ci∈I ai]/S is a lower bound of (αi)i∈I in A /S. Now, let us assume
that β = [b]/S is a lower bound of (αi)i∈I in A /S, which means that (b→ ai) ∈ S for all
i ∈ I. But since S = ↑{Θ}, we have Θ 4 (b→ ai) for all i ∈ I, hence Θ 4
(
b→ ci∈I ai),
so that β = [b]/S ≤S
[c
i∈I ai
]
/S
. Therefore,
[c
i∈I ai
]
/S
is the g.l.b. of the family
(αi)i∈I =
(
[ai]/S
)
i∈I in A /S. This proves that the induced Heyting algebra (A /S,≤S)
is complete, as well as the desired commutation property.
(3) ⇒ (1) Let us assume that the Heyting algebra (A /S,≤S) is complete, and that
the canonical surjection [ · ]/S : A → A /S commutes with arbitrary meets. Letting
Θ :=
c
S, we observe that[
Θ
]
/S
=
[k
a∈S
a
]
/S
=
∧
a∈S
[a]/S = [>]/S ,
hence Θ ∈ S. Therefore: Θ = min(S) and S = ↑{Θ} (since S is upwards closed). This
shows that S is the principal filter generated by Θ, which implies that S is finitely
generated (we obviously have S = Sep({Θ})) and tA ∈ S (by Prop. 3.27).
Remark 3.31. From a categorical perspective, the situation described by Prop. 3.30
is particularly important, since it characterizes the collapse of realizability to forcing.
Indeed, we shall see in Section 4.5 (Theorem 4.13) that the tripos induced by an im-
plicative algebra (A ,4,→, S) (Section 4.4) is isomorphic to a forcing tripos (induced
by some complete Heyting algebra) if and only if the separator S ⊆ A is a principal
filter of A , that is: if and only if the separator S is finitely generated and contains the
non-deterministic choice operator tA .
3.8. On the interpretation of existential quantification as a join
In Section 3.4, we have seen that existential quantifications cannot be interpreted by
(infinitary) joins in the general framework of implicative structures. (We shall actually
present a counter-example at the end of this section.) Using the material presented in
Section 3.7 above, we shall now study the particular class of implicative structures where
existential quantifications are naturally interpreted by joins.
Formally, we say that an implicative structure A = (A ,4,→) is compatible with joins
when it fulfills the additional axiomk
a∈A
(a→ b) =
(j
a∈A
a
)
→ b
for all subsets A ⊆ A and for all b ∈ A . (Note that the converse relation < holds in any
implicative structure, so that only the direct relation 4 matters.)
Implicative algebras: a new foundation for realizability and forcing 35
This axiom obviously holds in any complete Heyting (or Boolean) algebra, as well
as in any implicative structure induced by a total combinatory algebra (P, · , k, s) (Sec-
tion 2.7.1). On the other hand, the implicative structures induced by classical realizability
(Section 2.7.2) are in general not compatible with joins, as we shall see below.
When an implicative structure A = (A ,4,→) is compatible with joins, the existential
quantifier can be interpreted as a join
∃
i∈I
ai :=
j
i∈I
ai
since the corresponding elimination rule is directly given by the subtyping relationk
i∈I
(ai → b) 4
(j
i∈I
ai
)
→ b .
In this situation, we can also observe many simplifications at the level of the defined
connectives × and +:
Proposition 3.32. If an implicative structure A = (A ,4,→) is compatible with joins,
then for all a ∈ A , we have:
⊥ → a = > p-orA = >
a×⊥ = > → ⊥ a+⊥ = (λxy . x a)A
⊥× a = > → ⊥ ⊥+ a = (λxy . y a)A
Proof. Indeed, we have:
• ⊥ → a = (b∅)→ a = c∅ = >, from the compatibility with joins.
• p-orA = (⊥ → > → ⊥)uprise (> → ⊥ → ⊥) = >uprise (> → >) = >.
• a×⊥ = cc((a→ ⊥→ c)→ c) = cc(> → c) = > → ⊥.
• ⊥ × a = cc((⊥ → a→ c)→ c) = cc(> → c) = > → ⊥.
• By semantic typing, we have:
(λxy . x a)A 4
c
c((a→ c)→ (⊥ → c)→ c) = a+⊥ .
And conversely:
a+⊥ =
k
c
((a→ c)→ (⊥ → c)→ c) =
k
c
((a→ c)→ >→ c)
4
k
d,e
((a→ da)→ e→ da) 4
k
d,e
(d→ e→ da) = (λxy . x a)A
• The equality ⊥+ a = (λxy . y a)A is proved similarly.
In particular, we observe a trivialization of the parallel ‘or’: p-orA = >, so that by
Prop. 3.29, we get tA ∈ S 0K(A ). Therefore, by Prop. 3.27, it is clear that:
Proposition 3.33. If an implicative structure A = (A ,→,4) is compatible with joins,
then all its classical separators are filters.
Of course, this situation is highly undesirable in classical realizability (see Remark 3.31
above), and this explains why classical realizability is not and cannot be compatible with
joins in general (but in the degenerated case of forcing).
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Remark 3.34 (The model of threads). In (Krivine, 2012), Krivine constructs a
model of ZF + DC from a particular abstract Krivine structure (see Section 2.7.2), called
the model of threads. This particular AKS is defined in such a way that it is consistent,
while providing a proof-like term θ ∈ PL that realizes the negation of the parallel ‘or’:
θ  ¬((⊥ → > → ⊥)uprise (> → ⊥ → ⊥)).
In the induced classical implicative algebra (A ,4,→, S) (Section 3.2.3), we thus have
⊥ /∈ S and ¬p-orA ∈ S. Hence p-orA /∈ S and thus tA /∈ S (by Prop. 3.29), so that S
is not a filter (Prop. 3.27). From Prop. 3.33 (by contraposition), it is then clear that the
underlying implicative structure (A ,4,→) is not compatible with joins.
4. The implicative tripos
In Section 3.5, we have seen that any implicative algebra (A ,4,→, S) induces a Heyt-
ing algebra (A /S,≤S) that intuitively captures the corresponding logic, at least at the
propositional level. In this section, we shall see that this construction more generally
gives rise to a (Set-based) tripos, called an implicative tripos. For that, we first need to
present some constructions on implicative structures and on separators.
4.1. Product of implicative structures
Let (Ai)i∈I = (Ai,4i,→i)i∈I be a family of implicative structures indexed by an arbi-
trary set I. The Cartesian product A :=
∏
i∈I Ai is naturally equipped with the ordering
(4) ⊆ A 2 and the implication (→) : A 2 → A that are defined componentwise:
(ai)i∈I 4 (bi)i∈I :⇔ ∀i ∈ I, ai 4i bi
(ai)i∈I → (bi)i∈I := (ai →i bi)i∈I
(product ordering)
(product implication)
It is straightforward to check that:
Proposition 4.1. The triple (A ,4,→) is an implicative structure.
In the product implicative structure (A ,4,→) = ∏i∈I Ai, the defined constructions
¬a (negation), a × b (conjunction), a + b (disjunction), ab (application), ccA (Peirce’s
law) and tA (non-deterministic choice) are naturally characterized componentwise:
Proposition 4.2. For all a, b ∈ A = ∏i∈I Ai, we have:
¬a = (¬ai)i∈I a× b = (ai × bi)i∈I a+ b = (ai + bi)i∈I
ab = (aibi)i∈I ccA =
(
ccAi
)
i∈I t
A =
(
tAi
)
i∈I
Proof. Given a, b ∈ A , we have:
a× b =
k
c∈A
((a→ b→ c)→ c) =
k
c∈A
(
(ai → bi → ci)→ ci
)
i∈I
=
(k
c∈Ai
((ai → bi → c)→ c)
)
i∈I
=
(
ai × bi
)
i∈I
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ab =
k{
c ∈ A : a 4 (b→ c)} = k∏
i∈I
{
c ∈ Ai : ai 4 (bi → c)
}
=
(k{
c ∈ Ai : ai 4 (bi → c)
})
i∈I
=
(
aibi
)
i∈I
The other equalities are proved similarly.
Proposition 4.3. For all pure λ-terms t(x1, . . . , xk) with free variables x1, . . . , xk and
for all parameters a1, . . . , ak ∈ A =
∏
i∈I Ai, we have:
t(a1, . . . , ak)
A =
(
t
(
a1,i, . . . , ak,i
)Ai)
i∈I
Proof. By structural induction on the term t(x1, . . . , xk). The case of a variable is
obvious, the case of an application follows from the equality ab = (aibi)i∈I , so that we
only treat the case where t(x1, . . . , xk) = λx0 . t0(x0, x1, . . . , xk). In this case, we have:
t(a1, . . . , ak)
A =
(
λx0 . t0(x0, a1, . . . , ak)
)A
=
k
a0∈A
(a0 → t0(a0, a1, . . . , ak)A )
=
k
a0∈A
(
a0,i →i t0
(
a0,i, a1,i, . . . , ak,i
)Ai)
i∈I
(by IH)
=
(k
a0∈Ai
(
a0 →i t0
(
a0, a1,i, . . . , ak,i
)Ai))
i∈I
=
((
λx0 . t0(x0, a1,i, . . . , ak,i)
)Ai)
i∈I
=
(
t
(
a1,i, . . . , ak,i
)Ai)
i∈I
4.1.1. Product of separators Given a family of separators (Si ⊆ Ai)i∈I , it is clear that the
Cartesian product S =
∏
i∈I Si is also a separator of A =
∏
i∈I Ai. In the product sep-
arator S =
∏
i∈I Si, the relation of entailment a `S b and the corresponding equivalence
a a`S b are characterized by:
a `S b ⇔ ∀i ∈ I, ai `Si bi
a a`S b ⇔ ∀i ∈ I, ai a`Si bi
(for all a, b ∈ A )
For each index i ∈ I, the corresponding projection pii : A → Ai factors into a map
p˜ii : A /S → Ai/Si
[a]/S 7→ [ai]/Si
that is obviously a morphism of Heyting algebras (from Prop. 3.21 and 4.2). In this
situation, we immediately get the factorization A /S ∼= ∏i∈I(Ai/Si), since:
Proposition 4.4. The map
〈p˜ii〉i∈I : A /S →
∏
i∈I
(Ai/Si)
is an isomorphism of Heyting algebras.
Proof. For all a, b ∈ A , we have
[a] ≤S [b] ⇔ (a→ b) ∈ S ⇔ (∀i∈ I) (ai → bi) ∈ Si ⇔ (∀i∈ I) [ai] ≤Si [bi]
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which proves that the map 〈p˜ii〉i∈I : A /S →
∏
i∈I(Ai/Si) is an embedding of the poset
(A /S,≤S) into the product poset
∏
i∈I(Ai/Si,≤Si). Moreover, the map 〈p˜ii〉i∈I is clearly
surjective (from the axiom of choice); therefore, it is an isomorphism of posets, and thus
an isomorphism of Heyting algebras.
4.2. The uniform power separator
Let A = (A ,4,→) be a fixed implicative structure. For each set I, we write
A I = (A I ,4I ,→I) :=
∏
i∈I
(A ,4,→)
the corresponding power implicative structure, which is a particular case of the product
presented in Section 4.1 above. Each separator S ⊆ A induces two separators in A I :
— The power separator SI :=
∏
i∈I S ⊆ A I .
— The uniform power separator S[I] ⊆ A , that is defined by:
S[I] := {a ∈ A : ∃s ∈ S, ∀i ∈ I, s 4 ai} = ↑img(δI) ,
where δI : A → A I is defined by δ(a) = (i 7→ a) for all a ∈ A .
From the definition, it is clear that S[I] ⊆ SI ⊆ A . The converse inclusion SI ⊆ S[I]
does not hold in general, and we easily check that:
Proposition 4.5. For all separators S ⊆ A , the following are equivalent:
(1) S[I] = SI .
(2) S is closed under all I-indexed meets.
Proof. (1) ⇒ (2) Let (ai)i∈I be an I-indexed family of elements of S, that is: an
element of SI . By (1) we have (ai)i∈I ∈ S[I], so that there is s ∈ S such that s 4 ai for
all i ∈ I. Therefore s 4 (ci∈I ai) ∈ S (by upwards closure).
(2)⇒ (1) Let (ai)i∈I ∈ SI . By (2) we have s :=
(c
i∈I ai
) ∈ S, and since s 4 ai for all
i ∈ I, we get that (ai)i∈I ∈ S[I] (by definition). Hence SI = S[I].
Thanks to the notion of uniform separator, we can also characterize the intuitionistic
and classical cores (Section 3.3) of the power implicative structure A I :
Proposition 4.6. S 0J (A
I) = S 0J (A )[I] and S
0
K(A
I) = S 0K(A )[I].
Proof. Recall that: S 0J (A ) = ↑
{
(t)A : t closed λ-term
}
S 0J (A
I) = ↑{(t)A I : t closed λ-term}
S 0J (A )[I] =
{
a ∈ A I : ∃s ∈ S 0J (A ), ∀i ∈ I, s 4 ai
}
.
Since S 0J (A
I) is the smallest separator of A I , we have S 0J (A
I) ⊆ S 0J (A )[I]. Conversely,
take a ∈ S 0J (A )[I]. By definition, there is s ∈ S 0J (A ) such that s 4 ai for all i ∈ I. And
since s ∈ S 0J (A ), there is a closed λ-term t such that (t)A 4 s, hence (t)A 4 ai for
all i ∈ I. From Prop. 4.3, we deduce that (t)A I = ((t)A )
i∈I 4 (ai)i∈I (in A
I), hence
(ai)i∈I ∈ S 0J (A I). The equality S 0K(A I) = S 0K(A )[I] is proved similarly, using closed
λ-terms with cc instead of pure λ-terms.
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In the rest of this section, we shall see that, given a separator S ⊆ A , the correspon-
dence I 7→ A I/S[I] (from unstructured sets to Heyting algebras) is functorial, and
actually constitutes a tripos.
4.3. Triposes
4.3.1. The category of Heyting algebras Given two Heyting algebras H and H ′, a function
F : H → H ′ is called a morphism of Heyting algebras when
F (a ∧H b) = F (a) ∧H′ F (b) F (>H) = >H′
F (a ∨H b) = F (a) ∨H′ F (b) F (⊥H) = ⊥H′
F (a→H b) = F (a)→H′ F (b)
(for all a, b ∈ H)
(In other words, a morphism of Heyting algebras is a morphism of bounded lattices that
also preserves Heyting’s implication. Note that such a function is always monotonic.)
The category of Heyting algebras (notation: HA) is the category whose objects are
the Heyting algebras and whose arrows are the morphisms of Heyting algebras; it is
a (non-full) subcategory of the category of posets (notation: Pos). This category also
enjoys some specific properties that will be useful in the following:
(1) An arrow is an isomorphism in HA if and only if it is an isomorphism in Pos.
(2) Any injective morphism of Heyting algebras F : H → H ′ is also an embedding of
posets, in the sense that: a ≤ b iff F (a) ≤ F (b) (for all a, b ∈ H).
(3) Any bijective morphism of Heyting algebras is also an isomorphism.
4.3.2. Set-based triposes In this section, we recall the definition of Set-based triposes,
such as initially formulated by Hyland, Johnstone and Pitts in (Hyland et al., 1980). For
the general definition of triposes—where the base category Set can be replaced by an
arbitrary Cartesian category—, see for instance (Pitts, 1981; Pitts, 2001).
Definition 4.7 (Set-based tripos). A Set-based tripos is a functor P : Setop → HA
that fulfills the following three conditions:
(1) For each function f : I → J , the corresponding map Pf : PJ → PI has left and
right adjoints in Pos, that are monotonic maps ∃f, ∀f : PI → PJ such that
∃f(p) ≤ q ⇔ p ≤ Pf(q)
q ≤ ∀f(p) ⇔ Pf(q) ≤ p (for all p ∈ PI, q ∈ PJ)
(2) Beck-Chevalley condition. Each pullback square in Set (on the left-hand side) in-
duces the following two commutative diagrams in Pos (on the right-hand side):
I
f1 //
f2

I1
g1

I2 g2
// J
⇒
PI
∃f1 // PI1
PI2
Pf2
OO
∃g2
// PJ
Pg1
OO PI
∀f1 // PI1
PI2
Pf2
OO
∀g2
// PJ
Pg1
OO
That is: ∃f1 ◦ Pf2 = Pg1 ◦ ∃g2 and ∀f1 ◦ Pf2 = Pg1 ◦ ∀g2.
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(3) The functor P : Setop → HA has a generic predicate, that is: a predicate Tr ∈ PProp
(for some set Prop) such that for all sets I, the following map is surjective:
PropI → PI
f 7→ Pf(Tr)
Remarks 4.8 (Intuitive meaning of the definition). Intuitively, each Set-based
tripos P : Setop → HA describes a particular model of intuitionistic higher-order logic,
in which higher-order types are modeled by sets. In this framework:
(1) The functor P : Setop → C associates to each ‘type’ I ∈ Set the poset PI of all
predicates over I. The ordering on PI represents inclusion of predicates (in the sense
of the considered model), whereas equality represents extensional equality (or logical
equivalence). In what follows, it is convenient to think that predicates p, q, . . . ∈ PI
represent abstract formulas p(x), q(x), . . . depending on a variable x : I, so that
whereas
p ≤ q means (∀x ∈ I)(p(x)⇒ q(x))
p = q means (∀x ∈ I)(p(x)⇔ q(x)) .
The fact that PI is a Heyting algebra simply expresses that the predicates over I can
be composed using all the connectives of intuitionistic logic, and that these operations
fulfill the laws of intuitionistic propositional logic.
(2) The functoriality of P expresses that each function f : I → J induces a substitution
map Pf : PJ → PI, that intuitively associates to each predicate q ∈ PJ its “preimage”
Pf(q) = “q ◦ f” ∈ PI. Again, if we think that the predicate q ∈ PJ represents an
abstract formula q(y) depending on a variable y : J , then the predicate Pf(q) represents
the substituted formula q(y){y := f(x)} ≡ q(f(x)) (that now depends on x : I). The fact
that the substitution map Pf : PJ → PI is a morphism of Heyting algebras expresses
that substitution commutes with all the logical connectives.
(3) Given a function f : I → J , the left and right adjoints ∃f, ∀f : PI → PJ represent
existential and universal quantifications along the function f : I → J . By this, we mean
that if a predicate p ∈ PI represents a formula p(x) (depending on x : I), then
whereas
∃f(p) represents the formula (∃x : I)(f(x) = y ∧ p(x))
∀f(p) represents the formula (∀x : I)(f(x) = y ⇒ p(x))
(where both right-hand side formulas depend on y : J). Both ‘quantified’ predicates
∃f(p),∀f(p) ∈ PJ are characterized by the adjunctions
and
∃f(p) ≤ q iff p ≤ Pf(q)
q ≤ ∀f(p) iff Pf(q) ≤ p
(for all q ∈ PJ), which express the logical equivalences
and
(∀y : J)[(∃x : I)(f(x) = y ∧ p(x)) ⇒ q(y)] ⇔ (∀x : I)[p(x) ⇒ q(f(x))]
(∀y : J)[q(y) ⇒ (∀x : I)(f(x) = y ⇒ p(x))] ⇔ (∀x : I)[q(f(x)) ⇒ p(x)] .
Thanks to left adjoints, we can also define the equality predicate
(=I) := ∃δI(>I) ∈ P(I × I) (for each I ∈ Set)
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writing δI : I → I × I the duplication function and >I the top element of PI. From
what precedes, it should be clear to the reader that this predicate represents the formula
(∃x ∈ I)(δ(x) = (x1, x2) ∧ >) (depending on x1, x2 : I), that is equivalent to x1 = x2.
(4) The Beck-Chevalley condition expresses a property of commutation between substi-
tution and quantifications. It is typically used with pullback squares of the form
I ×K piI,K //
f×idK

I
f

J ×K
piJ,K
// J
where the adjoints ∃piI,K ,∀piI,K : P(I × K) → PI and ∃piJ,K ,∀piJ,K : P(J × K) → PJ
represent ‘pure’ quantifications over an abstract variable z : K (in the contexts x : I and
y : J , respectively). In this case, the induced equalities
∃piI,K ◦ P(f × idK) = Pf ◦ ∃piJ,K and ∀piI,K ◦ P(f × idK) = Pf ◦ ∀piJ,K
P(I ×K) ∃piI,K // PI
P(J ×K) ∃piJ,K
//
P(f×idK)
OO
PJ
Pf
OO P(I ×K)
∀piI,K // PI
P(J ×K) ∀piJ,K
//
P(f×idK)
OO
PJ
Pf
OO
express for each predicate q ∈ P(J ×K) the logical equivalences
and
(∀x : I)[(∃z : K)(q(y, z){y := f(x), z := z}) ⇔ ((∃z : K)q(y, z)){y := f(x)}]
(∀x : I)[(∀z : K)(q(y, z){y := f(x), z := z}) ⇔ ((∀z : K)q(y, z)){y := f(x)}]
describing the behavior of substitution w.r.t. quantifiers.
(5) Finally, the set Prop represents the type of propositions, whereas the generic predicate
Tr ∈ PProp represents the formula asserting that a given proposition is true. Thanks to
this predicate, we can turn any functional proposition into a predicate via the map
PropI → PI
f 7→ Pf(Tr) (I ∈ Set)
We require that this map is surjective for all sets I, thus ensuring that each predicate
p ∈ PI is represented by (at least) a functional proposition f ∈ PropI .
Remark 4.9 (Non-uniqueness of the generic predicate). It is important to observe
that in a Set-based tripos P, the generic predicate is never unique.
(1) Indeed, given a generic predicate Tr ∈ PProp and a surjection h : Prop′ → Prop, we
can always construct another generic predicate Tr′ ∈ PProp′, letting Tr′ = Ph(Tr)§§.
§§ To prove that Tr′ ∈ PProp′ is another generic predicate of the tripos P, we actually need to pick a
right inverse of h : Prop′ → Prop, which exists by (AC). Without (AC), the same argument works by
replacing ‘surjective’ with ‘having a right inverse’.
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(2) More generally, if Tr ∈ PProp and Tr′ ∈ PProp′ are two generic predicates of the
same tripos P, then there always exist two conversion maps h : Prop′ → Prop and
h′ : Prop → Prop′ such that Tr′ = Ph(Tr) and Tr = Ph′(Tr). Intuitively, the sets Prop
and Prop′ represent distinct implementations of the type of propositions (they do not
need to have the same cardinality), whereas the conversion functions h : Prop′ → Prop
and h′ : Prop→ Prop′ implement the corresponding changes in representation.
Example 4.10 (Forcing tripos). Given a complete Heyting algebra (H,≤), the functor
P : Setop → HA defined for all I, J ∈ Set and f : I → J by
PI := HI and Pf := (h 7→ h ◦ f) : HJ → HI
is a Set-based tripos, in which left and right adjoints ∃f, ∀f : PI → PJ are given by
∃f(p) :=
( ∨
i∈f−1(j)
pi
)
j∈J
and ∀f(p) :=
( ∧
i∈f−1(j)
pi
)
j∈J
(for all f : I → J and p ∈ PI = HI), and whose generic predicate (Prop,Tr) is given by
Prop := H and Tr := idH ∈ PProp .
Such a tripos is called a Heyting tripos, or a forcing tripos.
4.4. Construction of the implicative tripos
Theorem 4.11 (Implicative tripos). Let A = (A ,4,→, S) be an implicative alge-
bra. For each set I, we write PI = A I/S[I]. Then:
(1) The correspondence I 7→ PI induces a (contravariant) functor P : Setop → HA
(2) The functor P : Setop → HA is a Set-based tripos.
Proof. It is clear that for each set I, the poset (A I/S[I],≤S[I]) is a Heyting algebra,
namely: the Heyting algebra induced by the implicative algebra (A I ,4I ,→I , S[I]).
Functoriality Let I, J ∈ Set. Each function f : I → J induces a reindexing map
A f : A J → A I defined by A f (a) = a ◦ f for all a ∈ A J . Now, let us consider
two families a, b ∈ A J such that a a`S[J] b, that is: such that
c
j∈J(aj ↔ bj) ∈ S.
Since
c
j∈J(aj ↔ bj) 4
c
i∈I(af(i) ↔ bf(j)), we deduce that
c
i∈I(af(i) ↔ bf(i)) ∈ S,
so that A f (a) a`S[I] A f (b). Therefore, through the quotients PJ = A J/S[J ] and
PI = A I/S[I], the reindexing map A f : A J → A I factors into a map Pf : PJ → PI.
We now need to check that the map Pf : PJ → PI is a morphism of Heyting algebras.
For that, given predicates p = [a]/S[J] ∈ PJ and q = [b]/S[J] ∈ PJ , we observe that:
Pf(p ∧ q) = Pf([a×J b]
/S[J]
)
= Pf
([
(aj × bj)j∈J
]
/S[J]
)
=
[
(af(i) × bf(i))i∈I
]
/S[I]
=
[
(af(i))i∈I ×I (bf(i))i∈I
]
/S[I]
=
[
(af(i))i∈I
]
/S[I]
∧ [(bf(i))i∈I]/S[I] = Pf(p) ∧ Pf(q)
(The case of the other connectives ∨, →, ⊥ and > is similar.) The contravariant
functoriality of the correspondence f 7→ Pf is obvious from the definition.
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Existence of right adjoints Let f : I → J . For each family a ∈ A I , we let
∀0f (a) =
( k
f(i)=j
ai
)
j∈J
(∈ A J)
We observe that for all a, b ∈ A I and s ∈ S,
s 4
k
i∈I
(ai → bi) implies s 4
k
j∈J
(∀0f (a)j → ∀0f (b)j) .
Therefore
and thus
a `S[I] b implies ∀0f (a) `S[J] ∀0f (b) ,
a a`S[I] b implies ∀0f (a) a`S[J] ∀0f (b) .
For each predicate p = [a]/S[I] ∈ PI, we can now let ∀f(p) =
[∀0f (a)]/S[J] ∈ PJ .
Given p = [a]/S[I] ∈ PI and q = [b]/S[J] ∈ PJ , it remains to check that:
Pf(q) ≤ p iff
k
i∈I
(bf(i) → ai) ∈ S iff
k
j∈J
k
f(i)=j
(bj → ai) ∈ S
iff
k
j∈J
(
bj →
k
f(i)=j
ai
)
∈ S iff
k
j∈J
(
bj → ∀0f (a)j
) ∈ S
iff q ≤ ∀f(p)
Existence of left adjoints Let f : I → J . For each family a ∈ A I , we let
∃0f (a) =
(
∃
f(i)=j
ai
)
j∈J
=
(k
c∈A
( k
f(i)=j
(ai → c) → c
))
j∈J
(∈ A J)
We observe that for all a, b ∈ A I and s ∈ S,
s 4
k
i∈I
(ai → bi) implies s′ 4
k
j∈J
(∃0f (a)j → ∃0f (b)j) ,
where s′ := (λxy . x (λz . y (s z)))A ∈ S.
Therefore
and thus
a `S[I] b implies ∃0f (a) `S[J] ∃0f (b) ,
a a`S[I] b implies ∃0f (a) a`S[J] ∃0f (b) .
For each predicate p = [a]/S[I] ∈ PI, we can now let ∃f(p) =
[∃0f (a)]/S[J] ∈ PJ .
Given p = [a]/S[I] ∈ PI and q = [b]/S[J] ∈ PJ , it remains to check that:
p ≤ Pf(q) iff
k
i∈I
(ai → bf(i)) ∈ S iff
k
j∈J
k
f(i)=j
(ai → bj) ∈ S
iff
k
j∈J
((
∃
f(i)=j
ai
)
→ bj
)
∈ S iff
k
j∈J
(∃0f (a)j → bj) ∈ S
iff ∃f(p) ≤ q
Beck-Chevalley condition Let us now check that the Beck-Chevalley condition holds
for the functor P : Setop → HA. For that, we consider an arbitrary pullback diagram
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in the category Set
I
f1 //
f2

I1
g1

I2 g2
// J
and we want to show that the following two diagrams commute (in Pos):
PI
∃f1 // PI1
PI2
Pf2
OO
∃g2
// PJ
Pg1
OO PI
∀f1 // PI1
PI2
Pf2
OO
∀g2
// PJ
Pg1
OO
Since both commutation properties are equivalent up to the symmetry w.r.t. the diag-
onal (by exchanging the indices 1 and 2), we shall only prove the second commutation
property. And since the correspondence f 7→ ∀f is functorial, we can assume without
loss of generality that
• I = {(i1, i2) ∈ I1 × I2 : g1(i1) = g2(i2)}
• f1(i1, i2) = i1 for all (i1, i2) ∈ I
• f2(i1, i2) = i2 for all (i1, i2) ∈ I
using the fact that each pullback diagram in Set is of this form, up to a bijection.
For all p = [a] =
[
(ai)i∈I2
] ∈ PI2, we check that:
(∀f1 ◦ Pf2)(p) = ∀f1
([
(af2(i1,i2))(i1,i2)∈I
])
= ∀f1
([
(ai2)(i1,i2)∈I
])
=
[( k
(i1,i2)∈I
f1(i1,i2)=i
′
1
ai2
)
i′1∈I1
]
=
[( k
i2∈I2
g2(i2)=g1(i1)
ai2
)
i1∈I1
]
=
[((∀0g2(a))g1(i1))i1∈I1
]
= Pg1
([∀0g2(a)])
= (Pg1 ◦ ∀g2)(p)
The generic predicate Let us now take Prop := A and Tr := [idA ]/S[A ] ∈ PProp.
Given a set I ∈ Set and a predicate p = [(ai)i∈I]/S[I] ∈ PI, we take f := (ai)i∈I :
I → A and check that:
Pf(Tr) = Pf
([
(a)a∈A
]
/S[A ]
)
=
[
(ai)i∈I
]
/S[I]
= p .
Example 4.12 (Particular case of a complete Heyting algebra). In the particular
case where the implicative algebra (A ,4,→, S) is a complete Heyting algebra (which
means that → is Heyting’s implication whereas the separator is trivial: S = {>}), we
can observe that for each set I, the equivalence relation a`S[I] over A I is discrete (each
equivalence class has one element), so that we can drop the quotient:
PI = A I/S[I] ∼ A I .
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Up to this technical detail, the implicative tripos associated to the implicative alge-
bra (A ,4,→, S) is thus the very same as the forcing tripos associated to the underlying
complete Heyting algebra (A ,4) (cf Example 4.10).
4.5. Characterizing forcing triposes
Example 4.12 shows that forcing triposes are particular cases of implicative triposes.
However, it turns out that many implicative algebras that are not complete Heyting
algebras nevertheless induce a tripos that is isomorphic to a forcing tripos. The aim of
this section is to characterize them, by proving the following:
Theorem 4.13 (Characterizing forcing triposes). Let P : Setop → HA be the
tripos induced by an implicative algebra (A ,4,→, S). Then the following are equivalent:
(1) P is isomorphic to a forcing tripos.
(2) The separator S ⊆ A is a principal filter of A .
(3) The separator S ⊆ A is finitely generated and tA ∈ S.
Before proving the theorem, let us recall that:
Definition 4.14. Two Set-based triposes P,P′ : Setop → HA are isomorphic when
there exists a natural isomorphism φ : P ⇒ P′, that is: a family of isomorphisms φI :
PI
∼→ P′I (indexed by I ∈ Set) such that the following diagram commutes:
I
f

PI
φI
∼ // P
′I
J PJ
Pf
OO
φJ
∼ // P′J
P′f
OO
(for all f : I → J)
(Note that here, the notion of isomorphism can be taken indifferently in the sense of HA
or Pos, since φI : PI → P′I is an iso in HA if and only if it is an iso in Pos.)
Remarks 4.15. The above definition does not take care of generic predicates, since any
natural isomorphism φ : P ⇒ P′ automatically maps each generic predicate Tr ∈ PProp
(for the tripos P) into a generic predicate Tr′ := φProp(Tr) ∈ P′Prop (for the tripos P′).
4.5.1. The fundamental diagram Given an implicative algebra A = (A ,4,→, S) and a
set I, we have seen (Section 4.2) that the separator S ⊆ A induces two separators
S[I] ⊆ SI ⊆ A I
in the power implicative structure A I , where
S[I] :=
{
(ai)i∈I ∈ A I : ∃s ∈ S, ∀i ∈ I, s 4 ai
}
(uniform power separator)
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We thus get the following (commutative) diagram
A I
[·]/S[I] // //
[·]/SI

A I/S[I] = PI
i˜d
{{{{
ρI

[(ai)i∈I ]/S[I]_

A I/SI
αI
∼ // // (A /S)I = (P1)I ([ai]/S)i∈I
where:
— [·]/S[I] : A I → AI/S[I] (= PI) is the quotient map associated to AI/S[I];
— [·]/SI : A I → AI/SI is the quotient map associated to AI/SI ;
— i˜d : A I/S[I]→ A I/SI is the (surjective) map that factors the identity of A I through
the quotients A I/S[I] and A I/SI (remember that S[I] ⊆ SI);
— αI = 〈p˜ii〉i∈I : A I/SI → (A /S)I is the canonical isomorphism (Prop. 4.4) between
the Heyting algebras A I/SI and (A /S)I (= (P1)I);
— ρI : A I/S[I] → (A /S)I is the (surjective) map that is defined by ρI := αI ◦ i˜d, so
that for all (ai)i∈I ∈ A I , we have
ρI
([
(ai)i∈I
]
/S[I]
)
=
(
[ai]/S
)
i∈I .
Proposition 4.16. The following are equivalent:
(1) The map ρI : PI → (P1)I is injective.
(2) The map ρI : PI → (P1)I is an isomorphism of Heyting algebras.
(3) Both separators S[I] and SI coincide: S[I] = SI .
(4) The separator S ⊆ A is closed under all I-indexed meets.
Proof. (1) ⇔ (2) Recall that a morphism of Heyting algebras is an isomorphism
(in HA) if and only if the underlying map (in Set) is bijective. But since ρI is a surjective
morphism of Heyting algebras, it is clear that ρI is an isomorphism (in HA) if and only
the underlying map (in Set) is injective.
(2)⇔ (3) It is clear that ρI is an iso iff i˜d is an iso, that is: iff S[I] = SI .
(3)⇔ (4) See Prop. 4.5 p. 38.
We can now present the
Proof of Theorem 4.13 We have already proved that (2) ⇔ (3) (Prop. 3.30, Sec-
tion 3.7.4), so that it only remains to prove that (1)⇔ (2).
(2) ⇒ (1) When S ⊆ A is a principal filter, the Heyting algebra H := P1 = A /S
is complete (Prop. 3.30). Moreover, since S is closed under arbitrary meets, the arrow
ρI : PI → (P1)I is an isomorphism (Prop. 4.16) for all sets I. It is also clearly natural
in I, so that the family (ρI)I∈Set is an isomorphism between the implicative tripos P and
the forcing tripos I 7→ HI (where H = P1 = A /S).
(1)⇒ (2) Let us now assume that there is a complete Heyting algebra H together with
a natural isomorphism φI : PI
∼→HI (in I). In particular, we have φ1 : P1 →˜H1 = H,
Implicative algebras: a new foundation for realizability and forcing 47
so that A /S = P1 ∼ H is a complete Heyting algebra. Now, fix a set I, and write
ci := {0 7→ i} : 1 → I for each element i ∈ I. Via the two (contravariant) functors
P, H(–) : Setop → HA, we easily check that the arrow ci : 1→ I is mapped to:
and
Pci = ρi : PI → P1
Hci = pi′i : H
I → H
where ρi is the ith component of the surjection ρI : PI  (P1)I and where pi′i is the ith
projection from HI to H. We then observe that the two diagrams
A /S
φ1
∼ // H
A I/S[I]
Pci=ρi
OO
φI
∼ // HI
pi′i=H
ci
OO (A /S)
I
φI1
∼ // H
I
A I/S[I]
ρI=〈ρi〉i∈I
OO
φI
∼ // HI
idHI=〈pi′i〉i∈I∼
OO
are commutative. Indeed, the first commutation property comes from the naturality of φ,
and the second commutation property follows from the first commutation property, by
gluing the arrows ρi and pi
′
i for all indices i ∈ I. From the second commutation property,
it is then clear that the arrow ρI : PI
I → (P1)I is an isomorphism for all sets I, so
that by Prop. 4.16, the separator S ⊆ A is closed under arbitrary meets, which precisely
means that it is a principal filter of A .
Remarks 4.17. Intuitively, Theorem 4.13 expresses that forcing is the same as non-
deterministic realizability (both in intuitionistic and classical logic).
4.6. The case of classical realizability
In Sections 2.2.5 and 3.2.3, we have seen that each Abstract Krivine Structure (AKS)
K = (Λ,Π, . . .) can be turned into a classical implicative algebra AK = (P(Π), . . .). By
Theorem 4.11, the classical implicative algebra AK induces in turn a (classical) tripos,
which we shall call the classical realizability tripos induced by the AKS K.
Remark 4.18. In (Streicher, 2013), Streicher shows how to construct a classical tri-
pos (which he calls a Krivine tripos) from an AKS, using a very similar construction.
Streicher’s construction is further refined in (Ferrer Santos et al., 2017), that already
introduces some of the main ideas underlying implicative algebras. Technically, the main
difference between Streicher’s construction and ours is that Streicher works with a smaller
algebra A ′K of truth values, that only contains the sets of stacks that are closed under
bi-orthogonal:
A ′K = P‚(Π) = {S ∈ P(Π) : S = S‚‚} .
Although Streicher’s algebra A ′K is not an implicative algebra (it is a classical ordered
combinatory algebra, following the terminology of (Ferrer Santos et al., 2017)), it never-
theless gives rise to a classical tripos, using a construction that is very similar to ours.
In (Ferrer and Malherbe, 2017), it is shown that Streicher’s tripos is actually isomorphic
to the implicative tripos that is constructed from the implicative algebra AK.
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The following theorem states that AKSs generate the very same class of triposes as
classical implicative algebras, so that both structures (abstract Krivine structures and
classical implicative algebras) have actually the very same logical expressiveness:
Theorem 4.19 (Universality of AKS). For each classical implicative algebra A ,
there exists an AKS K that induces the same tripos, in the sense that the classical
realizability tripos induced by K is isomorphic to the implicative tripos induced by A .
The proof of Theorem 4.19 is a consequence of the following lemma:
Lemma 4.20 (Reduction of implicative algebras). Let A = (A ,4A ,→A , SA )
and B = (B,4B,→B, SB) be two implicative algebras. If there exists a surjective map
ψ : B → A (a ‘reduction from B onto A ’) such that
(1) ψ
(c
i∈I bi
)
=
c
i∈I ψ(bi) (for all I ∈ Set and b ∈ BI)
(2) ψ(b→B b′) = ψ(b)→A ψ(b′) (for all b, b′ ∈ B)
(3) b ∈ SB iff ψ(b) ∈ SA (for all b ∈ B)
then the corresponding triposes PA ,PB : Set
op → HA are isomorphic.
Proof. For each set I, we consider the map ψI : BI → A I defined by ψI(b) = ψ ◦ b
for all b ∈ BI . Given two points b, b′ ∈ BI , we observe that:
b `SB[I] b′ iff
c
i∈I(bi →B b′i) ∈ SB
iff ψ
(c
i∈I(bi →B b′i)
) ∈ SA
iff
c
i∈I(ψ(bi)→A ψ(b′i)) ∈ SA
iff ψI(b) `SA [I] ψI(b′)
From this, we deduce that:
(1) The map ψI : BI → A I is compatible with the preorders `SB[I] (on BI) and `SA [I]
(on A I), and thus factors into a monotonic map ψ˜I : PBI → PA I through the
quotients PBI = BI/SB[I] and PA I = A I/SA [I].
(2) The monotonic map ψ˜I : PBI → PA I is an embedding of partial orderings, in the
sense that p ≤ p′ iff ψ˜I(p) ≤ ψ˜I(p′) for all p, p′ ∈ PBI.
Moreover, since ψ : B → A is surjective, the maps ψI : BI → A I and ψ˜I : PBI → PA I
are surjective too, so that the latter is actually an isomorphism in Pos, and thus an
isomorphism in HA. The naturality of ψ˜I : PBI → PA I (in I) follows from the naturality
of ψI : A I → BI (in I), which is obvious by construction.
Proof of Theorem 4.19 Let A = (A ,4,→, S) be a classical implicative algebra.
Following (Ferrer Santos et al., 2017), we define K = (Λ,Π,@, · , k , K, S, cc,PL,‚) by
• Λ = Π := A
• a@b := ab, a · b := a→ b and ka := a→ ⊥ (for all a, b ∈ A )
• K := KA , S := SA and cc := ccA
• PL := S and ‚ := (4A ) = {(a, b) ∈ A 2 : a 4 b}
It is a routine exercise to check that the above structure is an AKS. Note that in this
AKS, the orthogonal β‚ ⊆ Λ of a set of stacks β ⊆ Π is characterized by
β‚ = {a ∈ A : ∀b ∈ β, a 4 b} = y{kβ}
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From the results of Sections 2.2.5 and 3.2.3, the AKS K induces in turn a classical
implicative algebra B = (B,4B,→B, SB) that is defined by:
• B := P(Π) = P(A )
• β 4B β′ :⇔ β ⊇ β′ (for all β, β′ ∈ B)
• β →B β′ := β‚ · β′ =
{
a→ a′ : a 4 cβ, a′ ∈ β′} (for all β, β′ ∈ B)
• SB := {β ∈ B : β‚ ∩ PL 6= ∅} =
{
β ∈ P(A ) : cβ ∈ SA }
Let us now define ψ : B → A by ψ(β) = cβ for all β ∈ B (= P(A )). We easily check
that ψ : B → A is a reduction from the implicative algebra B onto the implicative
algebra A (in the sense of Lemma 4.20), so that by Lemma 4.20, the triposes induced
by A and B are isomorphic.
4.7. The case of intuitionistic realizability
In Sections 2.2.3 and 2.7.1, we have seen that each PCA P = (P, · , k, s) induces a quasi-
implicative structure AP = (P(P ),⊆,→) based on Kleene’s implication. In intuitionistic
realizability (Hyland et al., 1980; Pitts, 2001; van Oosten, 2008), this quasi-implicative
structure AP is the logical seed from which the corresponding realizability tripos is
constructed. Indeed, recall that the intuitionistic realizability tripos P : Setop → HA
induced by a PCA P = (P, · , k, s) is defined by
PI := P(P )I/a`I (for all I ∈ Set)
where a`I is the equivalence relation associated to the preorder of entailment `I on the
set P(P )I (= A IP ), which is defined by
a `I a′ iff
⋂
i∈I
(ai → a′i) 6= ∅ (for all I ∈ Set and a, a′ ∈ P(P )I)
In the particular case where the PCA P = (P, · , k, s) is a (total) combinatory algebra,
the induced quasi-implicative structure AP turns out to be a full implicative structure
(Fact 2.5 (2) p. 6), and it should be clear to the reader that the above construction coin-
cides with the construction of the implicative tripos induced by the implicative algebra
(AP ,P(P ) \ {∅}), which is obtained by endowing the implicative structure AP with the
separator formed by all nonempty truth values. In other words:
Proposition 4.21. For each (total) combinatory algebra P = (P, · , k, s), the corre-
sponding intuitionistic realizability tripos is an implicative tripos, namely: the implicative
tripos induced by the implicative algebra (AP ,P(P ) \ {∅}) induced by P .
However, there are many interesting intuitionistic realizability triposes (for instance
Hyland’s effective tripos) that are induced by PCAs whose application is not total. To see
how such realizability triposes fit in our picture, it is now time to make a detour towards
the notion of quasi-implicative algebra and the corresponding tripos construction.
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4.7.1. Quasi-implicative algebras Quasi-implicative structures (Remark 2.2 (2)) differ
from (full) implicative structures in that the commutation property
a→
k
b∈B
b =
k
b∈B
(a→ b)
only holds for the nonempty subsets B ⊆ A , so that in general we have (> → >) 6= >.
In practice, quasi-implicative structures are manipulated essentially the same way as
(full) implicative structures, the main difference being that, in the absence of the equation
(> → >) = >, the operation of application (a, b) 7→ ab (Def. 2.11) and the interpretation
t 7→ tA of pure λ-terms (Section 2.4) are now partial functions. Formally:
Definition 4.22 (Interpretation of λ-terms in a quasi-implicative structure).
Let (A ,4,→) be a quasi-implicative structure.
(1) Given a, b ∈ A , we let Ua,b = {c ∈ A : a 4 (b → c)}. When Ua,b 6= ∅, application
is defined as ab :=
c
Ua,b; otherwise, the notation ab is undefined.
(2) Given a partial function f : A ⇀ A , the abstraction λf is (always) defined by
λf :=
k
a∈dom(f)
(a→ f(a)) .
(3) The partial function t 7→ tA (from the set of closed λ-terms with parameters in A
to A ) is defined by the equations
aA := a, (tu)A := tA uA , (λx . t)A := λ(a 7→ (t{x := a})A )
whenever the right-hand side is well defined.
(4) The above interpretation naturally extends to λ-terms with cc, letting
ccA :=
c
a,b∈A (((a→ b)→ a)→ a) (as before).
(The reader is invited to check that when the equation (> → >) = > holds, the above
functions are total and coincide with the ones defined in Section 2.4.)
In the broader context of quasi-implicative structures:
— All the semantic typing rules of Prop. 2.23 p. 13 remain valid (but the >-introduction
rule), provided we adapt the definition of semantic typing to partiality, by requiring
that well-typed terms have a well-defined interpretation:
Γ ` t : a :≡ FV (t) ⊆ dom(Γ), (t[γ])A well-defined and (t[Γ])A 4 a .
— The identities of Prop. 2.24 p. 15 (about combinators KA , SA , etc.) remain valid.
— Separators are defined the same way as for implicative structures (Def. 3.1 p. 21).
— A quasi-implicative algebra is a quasi-implicative structure (A ,4,→) equipped with
a separator S ⊆ A . As before, each quasi-implicative algebra (A ,4,→, S) induces a
Heyting algebra written A /S, that is defined as the poset reflection of the preordered
set (A ,`S), where `S is defined by a `S b :≡ (a→ b) ∈ S for all a, b ∈ A .
Given a quasi-implicative algebra (A ,4,→, S), we more generally associate to each
set I the poset PI := A I/S[I], where S[I] is the corresponding uniform power separator
(same definition as before). It is then a routine exercise to check that:
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Proposition 4.23 (Quasi-implicative tripos).
(1) The correspondence I 7→ PI induces a (contravariant) functor P : Setop → HA.
(2) The functor P : Setop → HA is a Set-based tripos.
From what precedes, it is now clear that:
Proposition 4.24. Given a PCA P = (P, · , k, s):
(1) The quadruple (P(P ),⊆,→,P(P ) \ {∅}) is a quasi-implicative algebra.
(2) The tripos induced by the quasi-implicative algebra (P(P ),⊆,→,P(P )\{∅}) is the
intuitionistic realizability tripos induced by the PCA P = (P, · , k, s).
At this point, the reader might wonder why we focused our study on the notion of
implicative algebra rather than on the more general notion of quasi-implicative algebra.
The reason is that from the point of view of logic, quasi-implicative algebras bring no
expressiveness with respect to implicative algebras, due to the existence of a simple
completion mechanism that turns any quasi-implicative algebra into a full implicative
algebra, without changing the underlying tripos.
4.7.2. Completion of a quasi-implicative algebra Given a quasi-implicative structureA =
(A ,4A ,→A ), we consider the triple B = (B,4B,→B) that is defined by:
• B := A ∪ {>B}, where >B is a new element;
• b 4B b′ iff b, b′ ∈ A and b 4A b′, or b′ = >B (for all b, b′ ∈ B)
• b→B b′ :=

b→A b′ if b, b′ ∈ A
>A → b′ if b = >B and b′ ∈ A
>B if b′ = >B
(for all b, b′ ∈ B)
Fact 4.25. The triple B = (B,4B,→B) is a full implicative structure.
In what follows, we shall say that the implicative structure B is the completion of the
quasi-implicative structure A ¶¶. Intuitively, this completion mechanism simply consists
to add to the source quasi-implicative structure A a new top element >B (or, from the
point of view of definitional ordering: a new bottom element) that fulfills the equation
(>B → >B) = >B by construction.
Writing φ : A → B the inclusion of A into B, we easily check that:
Lemma 4.26.
(1) a 4A a′ iff φ(a) 4B φ(a′) (for all a, a′ ∈ A )
(2) φ
(k
i∈I
ai
)
=
k
i∈I
φ(ai) (for all I 6= ∅ and a ∈ A I)
(3) φ(a→A a′) = φ(a)→B φ(a′) (for all a, a′ ∈ A )
(4) φ(KA ) = KB and φ(SA ) = SB
¶¶ Here, the terminology of completion is a bit abusive, since B always extends A with one point, even
when A is already a full implicative algebra.
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Proof. Items (1), (2) and (3) are obvious from the definition of 4B and →B. (Note
that (2) only holds when I 6= ∅.) To prove (4), we observe that
KB =
k
a,b∈B
(a→B b→B a)
=
k
a,b∈A
(a→B b→B a) uprise
k
a∈A
(a→B >B →B a) uprisek
b∈A
(>B →B b→B >B) uprise (>B →B >B →B >B)
=
k
a,b∈A
(a→A b→A a) uprise
k
a∈A
(a→A >A →A a) uprise >B uprise >B
=
k
a,b∈A
(a→A b→A a) = φ(KA )
The equality φ(SA ) = SB is proved similarly.
From the above lemma, we immediately deduce that:
Proposition 4.27. If SA is a separator of the quasi-implicative structure A , then the
set SB := SA ∪ {>B} is a separator of the implicative structure B.
Now, given a quasi-implicative algebra A = (A ,4A ,→A , SA ), we can define its
completion as the full implicative algebra B = (B,4B,→B, SB) where
— (B,4B,→B) is the completion of the quasi-implicative structure (A ,4A ,→A );
— SB := SA ∪ {>B} is the extension of the separator SA ⊆ A into B (Prop. 4.27).
Writing PA : Set
op → HA and PB : Setop → HA the triposes induced by A and B,
respectively, it now remains to check that:
Theorem 4.28. The triposes PA ,PB : Set
op → HA are isomorphic.
Proof. For each set I, we observe that the inclusion map φ : A → B induces an
inclusion map φI : A I → BI (given by φI(a) = φ ◦ a for all a ∈ A I). Given a, a′ ∈ A I ,
let us now check that:
a `SA [I] a′ iff φI(a) `SB[I] φI(a′) .
Indeed, the equivalence is clear when I = ∅, since a = a′ (for A I is a singleton). And in
the case where I 6= ∅, we have
a `SA [I] a′ iff
k
i∈I
(ai →A a′i) ∈ SA
iff φ
(k
i∈I
(ai →A a′i)
)
∈ SB
iff
k
i∈I
(φ(ai)→B φ(a′i)) ∈ SB
iff φI(a) `SB[I] φI(a′)
(since SA = SB ∩A = φ−1(SB))
(by Lemma 4.26 (2), (3))
From the above equivalence, it is clear that:
(1) The map φI : A I → BI is compatible with the preorders `SA [I] (on A I) and `SB[I]
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(on BI), and thus factors into a monotonic map φ˜I : PA I → PBI through the
quotients PA I := A I/SA [I] and PBI := BI/SB[I].
(2) The monotonic map φ˜I : PA I → PBI is an embedding of partial orderings, in the
sense that p ≤ p′ iff φ˜I(p) ≤ φ˜I(p′) for all p, p′ ∈ PA I.
(3) The embedding φ˜I : PA I → PBI is natural in I ∈ Set.
To conclude that the embedding φ˜I : PA I → PBI is an isomorphism in Pos—and thus
an isomorphism in HA—, it only remains to prove that it is surjective. For that, we
consider the map ψ : B → B that is defined by
ψ(b) :=
k
c∈B
((b→ c)→ c) (for all b ∈ B)
as well as the family of maps ψI : BI → BI (I ∈ Set) defined by ψI(b) := ψ ◦ b for all
I ∈ Set and b ∈ BI . Now, given I ∈ Set and b ∈ BI , we observe that
(1) ψI(b) a`SB[I] b, since
(λxz . zx)B 4
k
i∈I
(bi → ψ(bi)) and (λy . y I)B 4
k
i∈I
(ψ(bi)→ bi) .
(2) ψI(b) ∈ A I , since for all i ∈ I, we have
ψI(b)i = ψ(bi) 4 (b→B ⊥)→B ⊥ 4 ⊥ →B ⊥ = ⊥ →A ⊥ 4 >A .
Therefore: [b]/SB[I] = [ψ
I(b)]/SB[I] = φ˜I
(
[ψI(b)]/SA [I]
)
. Hence φ˜I is surjective.
From the above discussion, we can now conclude that:
Theorem 4.29. For each PCA P = (P, · , k, s), the intuitionistic realizability tripos
induced by P is isomorphic to an implicative tripos, namely: to the implicative tripos
induced by the completion of the quasi-implicative algebra (P(P ),⊆,→,P(P ) \ {∅}).
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